House   HIRC subcommittees   Europe   MidEast & S.Asia   IOHR
Cong. Smith 2.7.01 Cong. Hoyer 3.21.00 CSCE John J. Maresca 2.12.98 § archive

… Turkmenistan is not a democracy, yet USAID provides critical support for the growth and development of country-wide citizen initiatives. We are providing this support through the ISAR (formerly the Institute for Soviet- American Relations) grant program for assistance to environmental non-governmental organizations. While government policy prohibits the import of foreign magazines and newspapers, the Turkmen NGO, Catena, working with its U.S. partner, the Sacred Earth Network, provides free NGO access to information from all over the world through Catena's Internet link-up. Catena pays for its work with local NGOs by offering reasonable and reliable paid Internet service to Turkmen businesses and government officials.

Turkmen NGO Promotes Civic Education. Another Turkmen NGO, Dialog Center for Civic Education, can be counted along with Catena, as one of the few indigenous groups actively working in the rather restrictive environment of Turkmenistan. With USAID funding through the National Endowment for Democracy and a grant from the USAID funded NGO, Counterpart, Dialog recently took a significant step towards wide dissemination of the concepts of civic education by publishing a book entitled "The ABCs of Civic Education." This book has been well received as a vehicle for disseminating and promoting democratic principles and the concepts of civic education.
… In Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, the US through USAID provided technical assistance for upgrading and improving water systems to supply potable water to populations at risk. By focusing on providing safe drinking water supply, which is an environmental problem of the highest priority to each national government, U.S. credibility and access was greatly enhanced. USAID's tangible investments in potable water improvements have helped in turn to create strong working relationships with the region's new governments on issues of water management. Beginning in 1995, this credibility was used to establish a new USAID-supported regional program on water resources management to introduce concepts of water economics and conservation prevalent in the U.S. & Europe to the broader Aral Basin.

State Dept   bkgd º   U.S. embassy   regional bureau º ª
latest regional issues human rights FY2000 NIS Assistance report index Clinton UNPax USAID IATP DOJ DTRA Moscow SAO NDF § archive

Pentagon   6 U.S. soldiers stationed in T^km 9.30.00   OSCE   § archive

SOCCENT   Special Operations Command Central, MacDill AFBase Tampa, FL
"Assignment of Special Operation Force Liaison Officers (SOF LNO) to selected American Embassies is SOCCENT's most successful Traditional CINC Activities program. Liaison officers assist in planning and execution of SOF exercises, reducing the burden of such activities on small embassy staffs. Small Unit Exchanges (SUE) bring small groups from AOR countries to train in the US with SOCCENT components. … SOCCENT forces often provide the initial "foot in the door" for access, and nurture relationships with key counterparts throughout the region."

T^km NOT included in NATO Partnership for Peace training for combined peacekeeping & humanitarian relief ops. 1997/98 ¹
Exercise Regional Cooperation 2001 nee CENTRASBAT Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion ¹
conference   "21st Century Problems of Security, Consolidation and Stability in the Central Asian Region" re terrorism, drug trafficking and border insurgency 9.15-16.00 Alamaty, Kazakhstan
  [ exSoviet troops now trained in Germany by & for Pax Americana ]
Las Vegas cum Ashgabat: Central Asian sister armies of Staples Center security squads.

  Nuclear deterrence force still essential
  3.31.98   asst sec.defense strategy & threat reduction Edw.Warner Senate Armed Services Committee
… Cooperative Threat Reduction "Nunn-Lugar" pgm provides equipt, services & technical advice to T^km …
DoD officials said emphasis in these countries will be on improving border controls and safeguarding material & technology related to weapons of mass destruction. Despite accomplishments so far and activities presently under way, DoD officials say, more work is needed; threat remains a reality. Russia still has about 6,700 nuclear warheads and 1,200 missiles to carry them. DoD officials say the potential also exists for the spread of nuclear weapons material from Russia's "vast, underpaid nuclear weapons complex." About 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents and the ability to produce nuclear, chemical and biological agents remain in the former Soviet territory. "Hostile regimes and instability threaten U.S. interests in key regions," DefSec Wm. Cohen told House National Security Committee in February 1997.
U.S. arms sales ¹ ª ² º ³ ª   T^km 1997 grants $½ million materials ¹   $¼ million IMET   MEAN ¹ ²

Russian national interests & the Caspian Sea ¹ ²
12.99   Timothy L. Thomas Foreign Military Studies Office, Ft Leavenworth KS Perceptions vIV n4 p75-96.

Intl Narcotics Control Strategy rpt 1997
3.98   Bureau for Intl NLEA State Dept

The Road Ahead. Over the next year, the USG will work to implement the delivery to the Turkmen of the equipment described above. In addition, the USG will continue to encourage Turkmenistan to expand its drug control activities and establish the necessary legislative institutions. The USG will continue to offer law enforcement training opportunities, and will work to foster increased cooperation among Turkmenistan, the NIS and Russia in their counternarcotics efforts. Finally, the USG will continue to assist Turkmenistan's border interdiction efforts.

2000   Accomplishments. A national drug intelligence information center sponsored by the UN Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP) should be completed and operational beginning in 2001. It connects a central server in the Ministry of Internal Affairs with computer systems in the State Drug Control Commission, the Committee for National Security, the Border Guards, the General Prosecutor, and the Ministry of Health to facilitate collection, analysis and exchange of drug-related intelligence and enhance the effectiveness of Turkmen counternarcotics efforts. At the October 2000 UNODCCP/OSCE international conference on drugs, organized crime and terrorism, the Government of Turkmenistan formally approved its participation in the UNODCCP- sponsored precursor control project for Central Asia and signed the conference draft agreement on priority areas … Despite a lack of modern equipment and sufficient transport, Turkmen border forces are remarkably effective in detecting and interdicting illegal crossings by armed smugglers. …

IV. U.S. Policies and Initiatives
Bilateral Cooperation. The USG seeks to assist Turkmenistan in updating its law enforcement institutions and body of law to more effectively counter the illegal drug trade. Turkmen officials participated in USG-sponsored training programs in 2000, including courses for narcotics interdiction for border forces, regional and in-country drug enforcement seminars, and law enforcement seminars at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary.
The Road Ahead. The USG will continue to cooperate with Turkmenistan in its fight against the illegal drug trade. Through international and non-government organizations and programs, such as UNODCCP and the American Bar Association, the USG plans to assist Turkmenistan enhance its judicial and legal institutions to combat narcotics smuggling organizations and crime associated with illegal drugs. The USG will encourage long-term demand reduction efforts and foster supply reduction through interdiction training, law enforcement institution building and the promotion of regional cooperation.

NGOs   Amnesty Intl HRWatch U.S. Committee for Refugees CFR CPA: Ferghana Valley CLW CSIS (regional) FAS FIDH OECD Brookings Institute § archive re T^km

corporations & resources   DOE country brief 6.26.01 DOE regional analysis Tkm Caspian reserves rpt IMF NSRC info networks World Bank Ex-Im Bank A. Kilgore WRMEA 6.00 John J. Maresca 2.12.98 Deacon Alexander

5.21.01   New gas exporters GECF organization est. 5.19.01 in Tehran. Russia & Turkmenistan also joined organization.

Baku-Ceyhan pipeline cost maybe higher than expected   5.6.01   NewsBase David Woodward, president of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) and head of BP-Amoco's Azerbaijan unit, said on June 4 that the cost of constructing a Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil export pipeline might be higher than expected. Previously, he noted, the companies involved in the oil transport project had figured the cost of the pipeline at $ 2.4-2.7 bn. However, a basic engineering study completed last month indicates that the price tag is likely to reach $ 2.8-2.9 bn, he said. The latter figure is more in line with industry analysts' predictions that the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline would cost at least $ 3 bn and perhaps as much as $ 3.5 bn or more. Woodward stressed, however, that it was too early to make definitive statements about the cost of the BTC project. The figures in the basic engineering study are preliminary and bear a 30% margin of error, he stated. Once the partners in the project submit information on the expected cost of equipment, he said, it will become possible for the Main Export Pipeline Company (MEPCO) to estimate construction costs more precisely, with only a 10% margin of error. BP-Amoco noted that the sponsor group was due to meet in June to approve plans for a detailed engineering study of the BTC pipeline route. It will take about 12 months and $ 150 mm to complete this study, the company said. BP-Amoco is the operator of the AIOC consortium, which would be the first to use the BTC pipeline, and the second largest shareholder in MEPCO, which was set up to build the pipeline. Equity in MEPCO is currently split as follows: the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) holds 50%; BP-Amoco holds 25.41%; Delta Hess and Unocal of U.S. hold 1.25% and 7.48%, respectively; Statoil of Norway holds 6.37%; Turkish Petroleum (TPAO) holds 5.02%; and Itochu of Japan holds 2.92%. Ramco Energy of Great Britain, which has sold its interest in the AIOC to Amerada Hess, Devon Energy and Unocal, holds the remaining 1.55% Other major intl companies have expressed interest in joining the pipeline group. SOCAR's President Natik Aliyev said negotiations had begun with 3 companies, Chevron (US), Alberta Energy (Canada) and TotalFinaElf (France).

Blue Stream closes door to Turkmen gas 7.14.01   Kemal Ilter Turkish Daily News interview Ferruh Demirmen, petro consultant, Houston, TX; . Ph.D geology Stanford Univ., 30+ years Shell Intl retired 1994 "I am afraid Turkmen gas is lost to Turkey, at least for the next 10 years. The political leadership would not want to admit it, but in my view this is the stark truth. This did not have to be so" Ankara   Nearly 2 weeks ago Italy's Saipem engineering company broke ground to build twin natural gas pipelines under the Black Sea from Russia to Turkey, known as the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline. A few weeks later Kazakh oil will commence to be transported by ships via the Turkish straits, which have been under threat of oil transportation not only from Kazakhstan but also Russia and early production of Caspian oils. These two hot issues have been on Turkey's agenda and it seems they continue to be there. Therefore, the Turkish Daily News wanted to discuss these issues with an expert. We interviewed respected expert Ferruh Demirmen, who is a petroleum consultant and has spent more than 30 years working on oil issues. He made informative comments concerning Blue Steam, Turkmen gas and Baku-Ceyhan pipeline issues. TDN   You have been critical of the Blue Stream project in the past. Some of your concerns have been the technical difficulties associated with this project. Vittoria Mincato, the CEO of ENI, stated in the recent energy conference (The Story of Three Seas) in Istanbul that ENI is experienced with such projects. What is your reaction? F.Demirmen   Blue Stream is not like any other subsea pipeline that ENI has built. Its implementation will require a technological leapfrog, and that will not be without risks. The deepest pipeline built to date is the Mensa field pipeline in the Gulf of Mexico. There the pipeline is 100 kilometers long and the water depth is 1,600 meters. In contrast, the subsea section of Blue Stream will be 380 kilometers long and the water depth over much of the pipeline route will be much deeper than the Mensa field, reaching a depth of 2,150 meters in places. Furthermore, in terms of geohazards, the Black Sea poses far more serious technical challenges and risks than the Gulf of Mexico. I mentioned these risks in one of my articles published in your

newspaper (TDN, 4.23.01), and I do not wish to repeat them here. The one thing I want to emphasize is that some of these risks, such as pipe corrosion due to ambient acidity and pipe collapse due to high hydrostatic pressure, can be mitigated by taking certain preventive measures (at cost). But in a subsea setting no effective or reliable measures can be taken against earthquakes, slope instability and mass-gravity flows, all of which could cause pipe failure. Fortunately, such geohazards occur rarely in human terms; unfortunately, they are unpredictable. They are left pretty much to the vicissitude of nature, or chance.
I should also clarify that the risks I am referring to relate not so much to the construction phase of the pipeline, but rather to its operational phase -- expected to last at least 25 years, and possibly 50 years. There is a distinction between building a pipeline and operating it safely over a long period of time. Currently, we do not have enough experience with the operational phase of deep-sea pipelines to realistically assess their safety over prolonged periods. In the case of Blue Stream, facing rather unique geohazards, scarcity of empirical data is all the more troubling. Pipe failure during the operational phase of Blue Steam could cause not only interruption of gas supply for a long period of time (and very costly repairs), but also serious environmental damage to the Black Sea. After the Aral Sea in Central Asia (as a legacy of the Soviet Union), the Black Sea is already the most polluted inland sea in the world. Why jeopardize its fragile environment even further?

Let me hasten to add in this connection that I am not at all opposed to new technology. Innovation and technology, in fact, are a part and parcel of petroleum industry, and in a sense, they form the bloodstream of the industry. New technology, however, always entails a learning curve, and brings with it the risk of failure. New technology, therefore, must be justified on a need basis (such as cost reduction or lack of an alternative), and the risks associated must be acceptable. In the case of Blue Stream, I see just the opposite. Compared to the Azeri and Turkmen gas projects, Blue Stream will be the least competitive cost-wise, and the risk of failure, including potential environmental consequences, is high.
A far more sensible alternative to Blue Stream would have been an overland gas pipeline from the Russian town of Izobil'noye to Erzurum across Georgia. The transit fee payable to Georgia under this scheme would have been far outweighed by the lower cost of construction, ease of construction, and negligible environmental risks. The project would have also contributed to the economic prosperity and political stability in the Caucasian region. The only advantage, as it were, I see with Blue Stream is the prestige it may bring to ENI (Saipem) and Gazprom -- prestige that I am afraid may be short lived.
In any case, what Turkey has to gain from Blue Stream that it could not have gained from the overland Izobil'noye- Erzurum alternative, is not at all evident. Turkish energy officials, politicians and business circles defending Blue Stream have been mysteriously silent on this issue.

TDN   Mr. Mincato of ENI also stated during "The Story of Three Seas" conference that Turkey will need so much gas in the near future that it does not have time to discuss or argue about Blue Stream.
F.Demirmen   Mr. Mincato must have made that statement with a tongue in cheek. Turkey, indeed, will need lots of natural gas for domestic consumption and to fuel its economy, but it has committed itself to buying so much gas that it runs the risk of oversupply. Concern for oversupply was the reason why Turkey did not want to purchase more than 6.6 bcm of gas a year from Azerbaijan. The same concern is reflected (or hinted) even in the language contained in the new Natural Gas Market Act that took effect recently. Blue Stream figures prominently in Turkey's gas demand-supply equation, and it is appropriate that it receives close scrutiny in public forums.

Furthermore, Blue Stream has ramifications that go beyond gas demand-supply question. At present, Russian- sourced gas already makes up more than half of domestic gas consumption. Depending on what the forecast is regarding future gas consumption, in the next decade Russian-sourced gas including Blue Stream will constitute from 50 percent to nearly 100 percent of Turkey's domestic gas consumption. Such heavy dependence on Russia is obviously excessive from strategic and energy security points of view. It amounts to mortgaging to a large extent the country's energy needs on Russia. It could also be cause for concern for industries and businesses that rely on Russian gas for power generation, etc. How could Turkey be so relaxed or complacent about this issue? Not long ago, Poland passed a law that limits its reliance on Russian gas to no more than 40 percent of its domestic need.

TDN   How do you see the future of Turkmen gas as far as Turkey is concerned?
F.Demirmen   In so far as domestic consumption, Turkey had to make a choice between Blue Stream and trans-Caspian Turkmen gas projects (TCGP). Having made the decision to go ahead with Blue Stream, Turkey closed the door for Turkmen gas for domestic consumption purposes. The gas demand-supply equation simply makes Turkmen gas a nonviable option for Turkey.
Turkmen gas can in principle be imported to southern Europe via Turkey and Greece (the so-called INOGATE project), and this is purportedly what the Turkish energy officials and some politicians still have in mind. However, unless somebody is willing to put up capital in pursuit of political goals -- which is very unlikely -- I believe INOGATE's prospects as an economic entity are very dim. TCGP gas in southern Europe will face fierce competition from alternative sources, in particular Algeria. Azeri gas also has clear market advantage over TCGP gas.
Russia and Iran, both of which have vast gas reserves, have also tried to obstruct TCGP on ecological grounds and by raising the legal status of the Caspian Sea as a thorny issue. Russia does not want to loosen its historical grip on Turkmen gas, and Iran is a long-term competitor to Turkmenistan on gas exports.

TDN   Do you mean Turkmen gas is lost for Turkey?
F.Demirmen   I am afraid so, at least for the next 10 years or so. The political leadership would not want to admit it, but in my view this is the stark truth. This did not have to be so. After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Turkic republics in Central Asia and the Caspian region wanted to look beyond Russia for guidance and economic prosperity and to foster their newly gained political independence. Turkey's geographic position and its close ethnic and linguistic ties to these republics (not to mention religious affinity) gave Turkey the perfect opportunity to fill the role of leadership toward these nations. What was needed was a long-term strategic vision that transcended short-term commercial interests.

Turkey was only partially successful in such a leadership role, and in the case of Turkmenistan, its policy was a dismal failure. For Turkmenistan, exporting its rich gas resources westward along an east-west corridor was of vital importance. It saw the TCGP project as the embodiment of such aspirations. With much fanfare, Turkmenistan and Turkey signed inter-governmental protocols and a gas-supply agreement involving TCGP, which was strongly supported by the United States. The project had the backing of a reputable and financially strong Western consortium (Bechtel-GE Capital-Shell) that was seriously interested in the project.
But once Blue Stream entered the scene as a firm project, TCGP effectively lost its "raison d'etre." From then on, TCGP was primarily a political project, useful for some Turkish politicians to talk about but holding little real promise. Projects supported by mere political rhetoric and not backed by real need rarely become a reality. Turkey could not absorb both Blue Stream and TCGP at the same time.

It is true that some other obstacles arose in the path of TCGP, such as Turkmenistan President Suparmurat Turkmenbasi's insistence on some advance payment from the United States and more importantly, the Shah Deniz gas-condensate discovery in Azerbaijan. There were also personality conflicts. However, these were not insurmountable problems.
With regard to Shah Deniz, Turkey, acting as a benevolent "big brother," could have brought Turkmenbasi and Azerbaijan President Haydar Aliyev together to resolve their dispute on the sharing of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Turkey. That required good will and smooth relations with both countries. Having lost credibility, in fact good will, in the eyes of Turkmenistan because of Blue Stream, for Turkey such a role was hardly conceivable.

TDN   What do you think about U.S. position on Blue Stream?
F.Demirmen   U.S. has not advocated Blue Stream mainly because it saw it as a rival to TCGP, which it supported. The TCGP is part of the east-west energy corridor extending from the Caspian region to the West, bypassing both Russia and Iran. By supporting the east-west energy corridor, including the TCGP, the United States has tried to reduce the influence of Russia, and to some extent Iran, on the economic development of the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union. For the United States, this had the dual advantage of promoting the welfare and independence of these states while at the same time increasing the energy security of the West. I believe the U.S. also opposed Blue Stream because the project increased Turkey's dependence on Russia in terms of its energy needs. The United States has historically valued Turkey not only as a NATO ally, but also as a secular and democratic Islamic country in a critical region.

TDN   When we look at recent events, the Baku-Ceyhan option seems to be more powerful than before. Do you agree on this issue? Is there any obstacle in front of Baku-Ceyhan?
F.Demirmen   The Baku-Ceyhan project gained a major impetus, in fact experienced a near- breakthrough, within the last few months. There were several reasons for the dramatic turn of events. One reason was that the basic engineering study that was completed in May alleviated cost concerns. The new cost estimate is now $2.8-2.9 billion, higher than the $2.4 billion previous estimate, but still within the economically acceptable range. It is also worth pointing out that the additional cost pertains to such items as upgrade of the Azerbaijan terminal for oil batching operations (to include Kazakh oil) and expropriation of land in Azerbaijan and Georgia. These additional cost items had been foreseen but not included in the earlier cost estimate.
The second reason was the confidence that the potential investors gained regarding the economic significance of the Kashagan field in Kazakhstan. The Kashagan West well, completed in June, found oil, which was from the same reservoir as oil found in Kashagan East. This confirmed that Kashagan is a major oil field that could contribute to Baku-Ceyhan's throughput in the event of reserves insufficiency from the Azeri side.
The third reason was the affirmation, in the last month or so, by the Bush administration that it would continue the Clinton administration's energy policy in the Caspian region. Among others, this meant continued support to Baku- Ceyhan. All the signals coming from the Bush administration indicate that the U.S. trade sanctions against Iran will not be lifted in the foreseeable future. This means the Iran option will remain effectively closed, giving a further boost to Baku-Ceyhan.

The major development, perhaps overshadowing all these developments, however, was the BP's confirmation in recent months that Baku-Ceyhan is economic. BP went ahead even further, by declaring that reserves in Azerbaijan alone were sufficient to render Baku-Ceyhan viable. In other words, the Kazakh oil, while welcome, was no longer essential. The seal of approval given by BP was a crucial endorsement that Baku-Ceyhan needed. The sponsor group has approved expenditures ($150 million) for detailed engineering, and other oil companies, including Chevron, TotalFinaElf and ENI, all outside AIOC and previously not supportive of Baku-Ceyhan, have expressed interest in the project. Even Russia, probably prompted by the desire to deflect intense criticism of Blue Stream in the Turkish media in recent months, has softened its criticism of Baku-Ceyhan.
To return to your main question, I now see Baku-Ceyhan as a near-certain project with 90-95 percent chance that it will materialize. Barring exceptional and unforeseen circumstances, there is little that stands in the path of the project. Investor support for the construction phase seems all but certain.

TDN   You mentioned BP's crucial endorsement. BP, like other oil companies, had previously opposed Baku-Ceyhan. And many analysts had given little chance to Baku-Ceyhan. Why did BP change its position, and why were many analysts so pessimistic?
F.Demirmen   BP's endorsement was long in the making, and its announcement did not come as a surprise. In fact, in some subtle ways, BP had been hinting its assessment since last fall. I am sure BP knew since early last year that Baku-Ceyhan was economic given prevailing oil-price scenarios. Considering reserves in the ACG fields and Shah Deniz, I suspect Baku-Ceyhan was economic even at $15/barrel (real term). With oil prices becoming more robust and oil prices, at least for the midterm, expected to remain at $20 plus level, Baku-Ceyhan's viability was not in doubt. This is what I had maintained repeatedly myself on different occasions.
BP, however, chose to delay its firm endorsement of Baku-Ceyhan until recently partly because it needed to be more confident about oil-price forecasts and partly because it wanted leverage vis-a-vis the Iran option. With the Iran option remaining closed indefinitely, gradually an element of inevitability about Baku-Ceyhan emerged. Further waiting or uncertainty would have meant further delay in full-field development of ACG, which the company did not want to see happen. Shah Deniz development and gas export to Turkey was also in the offing.

As expected, project economics also improved with technology. Thanks to technology, wells in the ACG fields that were originally predicted to produce 5,000-7,000 barrels of oil per day (bo/d) came onstream at double these rates, some reaching 30,000 bo/d. This reduced field development cost. I am sure further reductions in cost will be forthcoming.
As for the analysts and pundits who were pessimistic or critical of Baku-Ceyhan, they ignored the dynamics of the oil industry, including the nonstatic character of reserves, underestimated the significance of Shah Deniz, and underestimated the growing concern, in particular in Europe, for increased tanker traffic in the Bosporus. Many also misread Vice President Dick Cheney's role in the Bush administration. Mr. Cheney played a key role in formulating Mr. Bush's energy policy. Many analysts and oil companies that had thought or hoped for Mr. Cheney to steer a pro-Iranian oil policy have been proven to be wrong. The pundits who persistently claimed insufficiency of reserves for Baku-Ceyhan have also been wrong. BP chief Sir John Browne's announcement In "The Story of Three Seas" conference last month, that the Azeri reserves were sufficient to make Baku-Ceyhan economic, was very significant.

TDN   Can you elaborate on the role of Shah Deniz with Baku-Ceyhan?
F.Demirmen   Shah Deniz played a pivotal role in bringing Baku-Ceyhan to its current stage. Discovery of the field in mid-1999 prompted BP and Statoil, both of AIOC, to change their basic strategy toward Baku-Ceyhan. The prospect of exporting gas to Turkey gave these companies a strong commercial incentive to support Baku-Ceyhan. Shah Deniz also provided badly needed liquid (condensate) reserves for Baku-Ceyhan.

TDN   What about Chevron and ExxonMobil? Do you think they will join Baku-Ceyhan?
F.Demirmen   Early this year Chevron expressed interest in Baku-Ceyhan. Where the company stands now in this respect, I do not know. Chevron's eventual participation in the project will heavily depend on the results of Absheron-1 exploration drilling results. The company has been keeping a tight rein on the information from this well. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the well found gas, but the commercial significance of this find is not known. If the Absheron structure holds commercial oil or gas, I very much suspect that Chevron will join Baku- Ceyhan. As for ExxonMobil, so far it has shown no interest in Baku-Ceyhan. The recently announced discouraging exploration results from the offshore Oguz concession in Azerbaijan, where ExxonMobil has an interest, are a disincentive for the company to join Baku-Ceyhan. However, ExxonMobil has other exploration interests in Azerbaijan, and its position vis-ŕ-vis Baku-Ceyhan may change over time.

TDN   Is Baku-Ceyhan the only route to protect the Turkish straits environmentally?
F.Demirmen   Before I answer that question, let me briefly point out the magnitude of the problem facing the Turkish straits. At present, some 50,000 commercial ships a year transit the Turkish straits, of which 5,500 are tankers that carry oil or oil products. The CPC pipeline that became operational this summer will eventually have a throughput of 65 million tons a year. The oil, coming from the North Caspian region, will reach the Russian port Novorossiysk and is currently destined for shipment to the West via the Turkish straits. That means oil tanker traffic through the Straits will easily double or triple.
However, this is not all. The CPC pipeline was designed before the Kashagan field was discovered. It is almost certain that some of the Kashagan oil will also find its way to Novorossiysk. That could mean oil tanker traffic through the straits increasing easily four or five-fold. That would certainly be not acceptable. It is therefore very important to find ways whereby Caspian oil would reach Western markets without transiting the straits.

Baku-Ceyhan is certainly a step in the right direction toward that goal. But it will not be enough. Some of the North Caspian oil reaching Novorossiysk should also be diverted away from the straits. Some Balkan options bypassing the straits have been considered in the past. The most notable of these is the Albanian-Macedonian-Bulgarian route known under the acronym AMBO. This is an oil pipeline project supported by the United States (which funded the feasibility study carried out by Brown & Root) and the European Union. I understand Russia also is interested.
I should stress that the bypass options such as AMBO are not ideal from an environmental point of view. They should also not be viewed as alternatives to Baku-Ceyhan. AMBO will help lessen oil tanker traffic through the straits, but oil must still be transported from Novorossiysk to Bourgas (the Bulgarian port) by tankers across the Black Sea. So, the Black Sea will remain exposed to dangers caused by oil tanker accidents. But a project such as AMBO at least offers a realistic alternative to maritime oil transport through the straits.

TDN   What about the current infighting in Macedonia? Will it affect the AMBO project?
F.Demirmen   The current political turmoil in Macedonia has certainly thrown cold water on AMBO, but once the political situation there settles, the project will undoubtedly attract renewed interest. I would also add that there has recently been an increased concern at international level about the safety of the straits from oil tanker traffic. This was quite evident in "The Story of Three Seas" conference. The start-up of the CPC pipeline, the increased campaign by nongovernmental organizations against the CPC, and the Turkish government's more proactive stance in this regard have helped bring about this situation. This is all a very positive development. Perhaps now is the time to capitalize on this momentum and try to divert some of the Novorossiysk-bound CPC oil away from the straits.

Transportation, Communication, Integration 5.25.97 Ashgabat, Turkmenistan   Cent.Asia conf.   C.Asia-Caucasus Inst., Carnegie Endowment for Intl Peace. Unocal & Cargill contrib.; Tkm govt committed resources. By far least discussed of 5 Central Asian republics, Turkmenistan, is due to become one of the most important to U. S. Bordering on Iran & Taleban-controlled part of Afghanistan, Turkmenistan has evident strategic importance. Its unique foreign policy of 'Positive Neutrality' marks it out as a special case in strategic terms. But it is Tkm vast natural gas deposits, currently est. at one third of world's remaining reserves, that make engagement & understanding of the country an absolute imperative.

Do all roads lead to Ashgabat? 5.8.01   Dr Robt M. Cutler NewsBase The recent summit of Turkic-language countries in Ankara provided Turkmenistan's President Saparmurad Niyazov with the opportunity to insist yet again that his country and his person are central, if not key, to the resolution of major problems in the region. His suggestion that the next Turkic summit be held in Ashgabat inevitably recalls his plan for a summit of the Caspian Sea states in the port city of Turkmenbashi. That meeting, which was scheduled to be held earlier this year, then twice postponed due to the parties' inability to reach agreement prior to the summit (such that the summit itself would be pointless), has now been indefinitely postponed. The most optimistic prediction made so far is that of Viktor Kalyuzhny, Russian President Vladimir Putin's special envoy for Caspian affairs, who says that such a summit may be possible by the end of 2001.

1. The Kyapaz/Serdar conflict and its background
However, Kalyuzhny's prediction was made before the Turkic summit in Ankara, and developments since then do not augur well. One of the issues that has faded into the background somewhat amid discussions of Iran's position as the "odd man out" among the Caspian littoral states is the disagreement between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan over rights to a field with estimated reserves of 500 mm barrels that Baku calls Kyapaz and Ashgabat calls Serdar. In early July of 1997, the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and the Russian oil companies, LUKoil and Rosneft, signed an agreement on the development of this offshore field. This agreement, however, contradicted the Russian Foreign Ministry's insistence at the time that the Caspian Sea should be considered an "inland lake" under international law. (Russia then held the position that no littoral state could exert control over seabed resources or take unilateral action without the agreement of all such states.)

Later that month, Rosneft pulled out of the agreement because Turkmenistan challenged Azerbaijan's rights to Kyapaz. Turkmenistan claimed rights to this field, which it called the Serdar field and for which it announced tenders for development in September of 1997. Turkmenistan had originally sought to include the Azeri and Chirag fields, to which the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) holds rights, in a broader claim, but in the end it focused on the Kyapaz/Serdar field. SOCAR made it clear to all concerned that in its view Turkmenistan had no legal basis or right to the contested field, and by the spring of 1999 this conflict had become the main outstanding issue in relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.

2. Where the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project comes in
In 1999, Niyazov tried to hold agreement on the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) project hostage to the outcome of the Kyapaz/Serdar dispute. The question was over the volumes of natural gas from the two sides to be allocated to the TCGP, the fate of which was tied to efforts to obtain a regional agreement on the Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan (BTC) main export pipeline. Because the United States insisted that the AIOC's Azeri and Chirag oil fields belonged indisputably to Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan showed little interest in helping Washington facilitate an accord on the BTC pipeline. Turkmenistan's position then seemed to change in September of 1999, when Azerbaijan threatened to insist that national sectors in the Caspian be delimited before it helped to build the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP).

Coincidence or not, one result of the November 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul, where documents covering both the TCGP and BTC projects were signed, was that Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan agreed not to allow the Kyapaz/Serdar disagreement to stand in the way of cooperation on the TCGP. But other obstacles arose early in 2000. The conflict between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan escalated when Azerbaijan sought to secure space in the TCGP for gas from its offshore Shah-Deniz field, where unexpectedly large gas reserves had been discovered. Baku asked for a quota of 14 bn cmpy, nearly half of the TCGP's projected volume of 30 bn cmpy. According to the original projections, Turkey contracted to receive 16 bn cm of Turkmenistani gas per year via the TCGP for its domestic market. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, planned on using the pipeline's remaining volume to obtain much needed hard currency by sending 14 bn cmpy of gas to Turkey for re-export to Europe. After the TCGP talks in Ashgabat faltered in mid-February, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan clashed. Azerbaijan threatened to construct its own pipeline with the BP-Amoco-led Shah-Deniz consortium, and this project has since gone independently forward.

3. Kyapaz/Serdar demarcation: A case study in a never-ending story
Niyazov addressed the Kyapaz/Serdar issue in public statements following the recent Turkic summit in Ankara. He said that Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan had agreed to go forward with discussions on the delimitation of their national sectors in the Caspian in the region of the Kyapaz/Serdar field. He and Aliyev in fact held discussions at the summit, their first face-to-face talks in several years. They agreed to consider the Kyapar/Serdar issue in the context of problems connected to the definition of the new international legal status of the Caspian Sea. (About 25 % of the Kyapaz/Serdar deposit would probably lie in Turkmenistan's sector of the Caspian Sea if the Caspian were divided by the median-line rule.)

A bilateral expert commission on demarcation was created in 1998, but it never met. Aliyev and Niyazov agreed in Ankara that it should actually meet, and its work was to help set the stage for the summit in Turkmenbashi later this year. And meet it did, in Ashgabat in early May. However, it broke up a few days later in a shower of recriminations from the Turkmenistani side, which charged that the Azerbaijani side was responsible for the "total deadlock." Niyazov declared that the demarcation issue should be decided by international-law experts without input from representatives of industrial interests.
In the past, Azerbaijan had offered to assist in joint exploitation of the deposits, which Turkmenistan is unable to undertake alone in a cost-effective manner. However, Ashgabat has consistently rejected such proposals. It is therefore reasonable to infer from current news reports that Baku has failed to accede to a request from Ashgabat, in line with the latter's public diplomatic position, that all sides (meaning Azerbaijan) desist from industrial activities (meaning research and exploration) in the disputed zone until agreement is reached (possibly meaning indefinitely).

4. Another "take" on Caspian demarcation
Meanwhile Kazakhstan proposed a bilateral agreement with Azerbaijan on demarcation in the Caspian. Both of these countries have signed bilateral agreements with Russia providing for use of the "modified median-line" principle for defining national sectors, with the seabed and subsoil resources divided between the sides and waters remaining in common. The line dividing them joins the edge of the Russian sector in the north and the edge of the Turkmenistani sector in the south. According to reports, Kazakhstan is already in consultation with Russia on the coordinates of their bilateral line of demarcation, which would fix the northernmost point of the Kazakstan- Azerbaijan line. It will be most interesting to see whether Russia and Kazakhstan can bring Turkmenistan along as regards the southernmost point. If the Turkmenistani side did make such an agreement, it would mark the first time that Ashgabat has made public a position in favour of the modified median-line principle.

5. The end of a different story
The TCGP, as well as the Kyapaz/Serdar issue, also came in for comment by Niyazov at the Turkic summit. The Turkmenistani president took the opportunity to blame Cumhur Ersumer, Turkey's former energy minister, for the problems with the TCGP. Towards the end of April, indictments were handed down against 15 individuals for bribery and kickbacks in the awarding of contracts for energy projects and power plants. Because Ersumer could not be subject to legal pursuit as a minister, he was not one of the 15. However, according to press reports he was repeatedly mentioned by those who were indicted. Ersumer, who resigned shortly before the summit as a result of widening investigations into corruption scandals in the government, has himself blamed subordinates for the ways in which contracts were awarded.
Niyazov, for his part, blamed Ersumer for insisting on negotiating prices for delivery of Turkmenistani gas to the Turkish border, by implication requiring Turkmenistan to settle other terms of the deal including the volumes and cost of transit of the gas across Azerbaijan and Georgia. Whether true or not, this cannot be deemed unusual. All it means is that Ashgabat was being required to participate in negotiations with the PSG International pipeline consortium, which was then still interested in the project, as well as with Baku and Tbilisi.

However, the success in negotiating the BTC framework accords, which were signed at the late 1999 Istanbul OSCE summit, illustrates that even such a demand as Ersumer is supposed to have made is not outlandish and could even pass for normal practice. Indeed, Niyazov's criticism of Ersumer cannot be taken as realistic, since it implies that Turkmenistan deserves to have the deal handed to it on a platter. The most telling comment may have been made by Aliyev, who said when asked about the TCGP by an Azerbaijani journalist, "Why are you asking?" He continued: "We are only a transit country and... have no other interests here.... [Niyazov has] rejected the idea [and] it does not make much difference to us." Nor was there an on-the-record response from Ankara to Niyazov's statement that it was "up to Turkey" to choose whether it wanted the TCGP or not.

6. Next year in Ashgabat?
The first of the Turkic summits was held at the initiative of Turkish President Turgut Ozal in 1992, and the meetings have since become annual events. However, this year Niyazov criticized the summits as ineffective and without influence on international relations in general or on relations between the Turkic-speaking countries specifically. Interestingly, he also publicly declared that more should be done to attain "a union of Turkic states", called for a "consolidation" of the summit series and offered Ashgabat as the venue for next year's meeting. In this context, the state press agency of Turkmenistan has referred to a "Turkic-Speaking Countries' Organization", saying that Niyazov thinks such an entity should be further developed.
It follows, then, that we may look forward to another diplomatic initiative from Niyazov, one almost as ambitious as the Caspian Sea summit initiative but this time seeking to establish the Turcophone summit series as a self- supporting international institution with an autonomous secretariat. And as he has invited all the participants (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) to Ashgabat for the next summit, we may presume that he intends to suggest that city as the seat of the organization.

environment   UNEP Forest Conservation language § archive The Caspian's False Promise 6.98   Martha Brill Olcott Foreign Policy   oil ¹ ² TURKMENISTAN   size 188,456 sq. mi.; pop. 4.19 million   Former party boss Saparmurat Niyazov became president Oct. 1990. Niyazov sees himself as a modern Ataturk but rules the country like a medieval khan. Despite Niyazov's promises of great oil & gas wealth, the country's population still has lowest life expectancy of any former Soviet republic.

Tough issues addressed at C.Asian env. conf. ¹ 3.6-8.01   Marshall Center, CENTCOM, USArmy War College, and Off. Deputy UnderSec. Defense (Environmental Security) co-sponsored conference re critical environmental security issues. 65 delegates represented Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Turkey, U.S. and various intl organizations. Presentations scientific-technical aspects of regional environmental issues and case studies on role of Philippine, Turkish, and U.S. militaries in responding to natural & man-made environmental disasters.

borders Russia, Iran renew ties 3.12.01 A. Kilgore WRMEA 6.00 § archive § archive Taliban aid A.Rashid, Dushanbe News.telegraph.co.uk Afgh Fdtn (Scowcroft) Afgh Online Afgh Daily emigres § archive Taliban aid Tkm gas key to Ukraine economy Tkm president approves Ukraine barter deal Baku embassy closed 6.20.01 Tkm calls for Azb halt in disputed oil fields

6 Turkic-speaking nations pledge closer economies 4.26.01   Dow Jones Leaders of 6 Turkic-speaking countries have met in Istanbul for an annual summit and pledged to build closer economic ties between their countries. The summit brought together the presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the parliament speaker of Uzbekistan. Pipeline projects to transport the region's oil and natural gas resources to world markets, and a scheme to revive the historic Silk Road route from Europe to China, are likely to figure in talks during the summit's two days. "These meetings have come to symbolize the mutual respect and common interests which exist among us," the summit's host, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, said in opening the meetings. A pipeline that would bring oil from the region to Turkey's Mediterranean coast is likely to be a key topic of discussion. The pipeline would bypass Russia and Iran and strengthen the region's ties with the West.

Revolutions In The East
Michael Albert & Robin Hahnel   Z magazine

reading list & links Wash.Rpt MidEast Affairs ¹ media & org links IWPR regional media & org links U.Utah MidEast & N.Africa links JoD, et al search Central Asia Monitor Amazon re Turkmenistan

Fiona Hill   bio & bibl. links   regional manifesto Pope's mission: Taking on Kremlin one more time 6.26.01   interview Ted Koppel Nightline ABC News F. HILL … Ukraine was part of Russian Empire since 1600s. But really, Ukraine is cradle not only of Russian state & Russian Empire, but also cradle of Christianity in Russian lands. And it's been a battle ground of Catholicism & Eastern Orthodoxy for several centuries now.

At one point, many of Ukraine lands were under Poland. … President Kuchma is in some major corruption scandals and accused of complicity in the death of investigating journalist. Ukrainian economy continues to fail. Ukraine has a strategic choice now between closer relationship with Russia or continue path it's had for the last 10 years towards Europe. Pope's visit has just come at end of visit by Def.Sec Rumsfeld, emphasizing Ukraine's importance for the future of European security. …

various posts   Thorn Tree

excerpts   FY2000 NIS Assistance report
Jan. 01   re Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan's economy is still almost entirely under state control. The government has pursued import- substitution policies in many sectors, especially in agriculture, which represents the largest sector of the economy. Official statistics show strong growth in the national economy after nearly a decade of continual decline; however, these statistics are neither reliable nor readily available, as the government treats basic indicators such as inflation and GDP growth as confidential information. It is therefore impossible for outside observers to measure growth accurately, but the Turkmen Government's claims are almost certainly untrue. Turkmenistan's agricultural sector is unreformed and, according to unofficial estimates, has remained static or declined over the past few years, despite government-mandated increases in production of the country's two principal crops, cotton and wheat. The main factors limiting the potential of agriculture in Turkmenistan are the scarcity of water resources, and the inefficient management of what little water is available for irrigation. On the other hand, Turkmenistan has large deposits of oil and gas, and is able to finance its economic polices through gas sales, most of which are still to Iran, Russia and other NIS countries.

Turkmenistan's overall debt situation remains worrisome. The country's external debt is estimated at almost $2 billion, and the Central Bank has virtually no official reserves. The government is technically in default to various international creditors. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) includes Niyazov's Foreign Export Reserve Fund (FERF), which it estimates at $1.5 billion, in its calculation of Turkmenistan's official reserves but President Niyazov has made it clear that these funds are not available to meet Turkmenistan's external debt obligations. Turkmenistan's fiscal deficit is less clear. The government claims that it is running a budget surplus, but the budget is not transparent and many government ministries are required to cover their own expenditures. Expenditures for large showcase projects designed to beautify the capital city of Ashgabat and to improve the nation's infrastructure continue to mount. Meanwhile, foreign investment other than in the country's oil and gas sector is small and is probably declining. Convertibility problems top the list of problems faced by foreign investors. The official exchange rate, to which foreign firms are forced to adhere, is roughly a fourth of the black-market rate. Foreign firms are unable to convert Turkmenistan's national currency, the manat, back into hard currency without substantial losses. The dual exchange rates also fuel official corruption, as individuals with access to foreign currency at the official exchange rate are able to profit through arbitrage. Official corruption is another principal obstacle to foreign investment. All in all, Turkmenistan's near-term political and economic outlook offers few prospects for serious reforms that would build the necessary foundation for long-term economic growth and democracy; however, the country has great political and economic potential.

p 376 TURKMENISTAN CRITERIA FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE UNDER SECTION 498A(a) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961
Section 201 of the FREEDOM Support Act amended Section 498A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to require that the President "take into account not only relative need but also the extent to which that independent state is acting to:"
Section 498A(a)(1): "make significant progress toward, and is committed to the comprehensive implementation of, a democratic system based on principles of the rule of law, individual freedoms, and representative government determined by free and fair elections."

Turkmenistan remains a one-party state dominated by its president and his closest advisors. Despite President Niyazov's commitments during and after his April 1998 visit to the U.S., the T^km Govt has failed to take any concrete steps to strengthen the rule of law and political pluralism. The 50-member unicameral parliament (Mejlis) has no genuinely independent authority, and in practice the president controls the judicial system. Seriously flawed parliamentary elections held on December 12, 1999 included only govt-selected candidates and did not allow for any free political discourse; turnout was announced at 98.9 percent, despite reports that many polling places remained empty throughout the election day. A 1994 referendum of questionable constitutionality having already extended President Niyazov's term of office to ten years (through 2002), on December 28, 1999, the Mejlis extended his presidency indefinitely in response to a unanimous resolution by the annual People's Council that he be made president for life.

The T^km Govt severely restricts freedom of speech and does not permit freedom of the press. There is no organized political opposition in Turkmenistan, and individual opposition figures are regularly harassed and/or imprisoned for their activities. The govt completely controls the media, censoring all newspapers and domestic electronic media and rarely permitting independent criticism of government policy or officials. The government registered no new political parties in 1999; the only officially registered party is the Democratic Party (formerly the Communist Party of Turkmenistan). Freedom of peaceful assembly and association are restricted in practice. The government does not allow any public meetings or demonstrations involving a political agenda or criticism of government policies. In practice, the govt also prevents private political meetings and gatherings from taking place.

Section 498A(a)(2): "make significant progress in, and is committed to the comprehensive implementation of, economic reform based on market principles, private ownership, and integration into the world economy, including implementation of the legal & policy frameworks necessary for such reform (including protection of intellectual property and respect for contracts)."
T^km Govt has taken a slow approach to economic reform. On 12.27.95 President Niyazov announced a series of macroeconomic reforms, which included, among others, the three key reforms recommended by the IMF: control of the expansion of credit, limited national budget deficits and liberalized foreign exchange. President Niyazov plans a ten-year state-managed transition and hopes to utilize hard currency earnings from Turkmenistan's natural resources to finance expenditures and soften the impact of the economic transition. The economy, however, remains predominantly under state control. The World Bank has approved no loans to Turkmenistan since 1997. Since Turkmenistan joined in 1992, the World Bank has approved 3 projects with a cumulative value of $89.5 million. Turkmenistan has laws on foreign investment, banking, property ownership and intellectual property rights, but respect of contracts remains an issue. The government introduced its currency, the manat, in November 1993, which has helped it establish an independent monetary policy. A bilateral trade agreement providing for reciprocal Normal Trade Relations (formerly MFN) and containing intellectual property rights (IPR) provisions entered into force October 1993. An Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) agreement entered into force in June 1992. Turkmenistan is a member of the IMF, World Bank, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and joined the Asian Development Bank in September 2000. Turkmenistan has not applied to join the World Trade Organization. Consistent with U.S. legislation, the U.S. would be opposed to any new proposals for international financial institution assistance to Turkmenistan other than to address basic human needs, because of the absence of a functioning system of civilian audits of military expenditures.

p 377   Section 498A(a)(3): "respect internationally recognized human rights, including the rights of minorities and the rights to freedom of religion and emigration."
The govt's record on respect for internationally recognized human rights is extremely poor. Authorities routinely beat criminal suspects, prisoners, and witnesses before & after trial. The govt restricts civil and political rights, and security agents have used force to suppress political opposition. Others who have protested govt policies and economic conditions reportedly remain in psychiatric hospitals. The government has attempted to extradite Turkmen dissidents from Uzbekistan & Russia on charges that appear politically motivated. As part of its efforts to foster a sense of nationhood among the Turkmen, the government has reversed decades of favoritism toward Russians. Ethnic Turkmen now receive favored treatment, leading ethnic minorities to complain of discrimination, esp. in employment practices. Although documented cases of extra-judicial killings have been rare in Turkmenistan, one prominent prisoner of conscience did die in prison under suspicious circumstances during 1999.

The constitution guarantees freedom of religion and does not establish a state religion. However, while recent amendments to Turkmen law purport to provide greater religious freedom, they tighten govt control over religious groups. The govt tries to control all Islamic activity. In contrast to the Soviet era, when imams were chosen by their communities, imams now are appointed by the govt only. Since 1997, the govt has forbidden the teaching of Islamic theology by imams affiliated with mosques. Religious congregations are technically required to register with the govt. The requirement that religious organizations have at least 500 members has prevented all but two religions, Russian Orthodox Christianity and Sunni Islam, from registering. During 2000, the Turkmen Government continued its harassment of minority religious faiths.
Worshipers have been imprisoned, beaten and/or pressed to renounce their faith. However, minority congregations have been allowed to worship undisturbed in private homes, following an April 2000 presidential decree requiring law enforcement authorities to respect citizens' freedom from illegal search and seizure and right to privacy in their homes. Recently, however, law enforcement officials haveharassed, beaten and tortured some Protestants affiliated with home churches.

The govt does not generally restrict movement within Turkmenistan, although travel to border zones is tightly controlled. The govt uses its power to issue passports and exit visas as a general means of restricting international travel by its critics. While most citizens of Turkmenistan are permitted to emigrate without undue restriction, some govt opponents have been denied the opportunity to emigrate. As part of a presidentially approved master redevelopment plan for Ashgabat, the govt is forcibly displacing residents from several neighborhoods with less than a week's advanced notification and minimal, if any, compensation for their destroyed property. Inst. for Democracy & Human Rights (IDAHR) was founded in 1996 with a mandate to support democratization and monitor the protection of human rights. While an IDAHR investigation of poor prison conditions led to a general amnesty, the Institute is not independent of the govt. Initial hopes that the IDAHR would serve as an ombudsman for the people have not been realized.

Section 498A(a)(4): "respect international law and obligations and adhere to the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security & Cooperation in Europe and the Charter of Paris, including the obligations to refrain from the threat or use of force and to settle disputes peacefully."
The T^km Govt has a proclaimed policy of neutrality towards other nations and has done nothing inconsistent with its OSCE obligations to refrain from the threat of the use of force and to settle disputes peacefully. Turkmenistan is at peace with its neighbors. The Turkmen military does not currently present an offensive threat to the region. Turkmenistan complies with the Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in Europe of the 1994 Vienna Document, regularly submitting CSBM declarations and undergoing a CSBM inspection in February 1998

Section 498A(a)(5): "cooperate in seeking peaceful resolution of ethnic and regional conflicts."
Turkmenistan supports regional and international efforts to resolve peacefully the conflicts in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The Turkmen Government hosted peace talks among the various Tajik parties, and it has played an active role in the UN-brokered dialogue on an Afghan settlement.

Section 498A(a)(6): "implement responsible security policies, including:
(A) adhering to arms control obligations derived from agreements signed by the former Soviet Union;
(B) reducing military forces and expenditures to a level consistent with legitimate defense requirements;
(C) not proliferating nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, their delivery systems, or related technologies; and
(D) restraining conventional weapons transfers."
p 378   The T^km Govt has formally declared its willingness and intent to accept all of the relevant arms control obligations of the former Soviet Union. Turkmenistan acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1994. Turkmen armed forces are guided by a defensive military doctrine. We do not believe that Turkmenistan has engaged in the proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, their delivery systems, or related technologies. Turkmenistan is a party to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and a party to the Biological Weapons Convention. We have recently initiated a limited export control and border security dialogue with Turkmenistan, including responsible missile proliferation policy.
Turkmenistan ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in Feb. 1998. To our knowledge, Turkmenistan has not engaged in any significant level of conventional arms transfers. Additionally, Turkmenistan has acknowledged it is a successor to the former Soviet Union's obligations under the INF Treaty. Although it does not actively participate in the Special Verification Commission, it continues to observe the Treaty's obligations. Turkmenistan has submitted Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) annual data declarations for 1995-2000 and has willingly undergone CSBM inspections and evaluation visits in accordance with the OSCE Vienna Document.

Section 498A(a)(7): "take constructive actions to protect the international environment, prevent significant transborder pollution, and promote sustainable use of natural resources."
Although Turkmenistan has one of the best developed systems of nature preserves in Central Asia, its Karakum Canal contributes to the region's most serious environmental problems, notably in the Aral Sea, by exacerbating existing water pollution, pesticide run-off, and water-table problems. President Niyazov currently holds the rotating presidency of the Interstate Fund on the Aral Sea, made up of the 5 Central Asian states and several intl organizations secretariat, and the Fund's executive committee has its seat in Ashgabat at present. Turkmenistan joined the other Central Asian states in a recent decision to locate the headquarters of a Regional Environmental Center (REC) in Almaty, Kazakhstan. The U.S. and the European Union are supporting and co- financing the establishment of this independent, non-profit, and non-political organization, the mission of which will be to strengthen civil society and support sustainable development by promoting public awareness and participation in regional environmental decision-making. Turkmenistan also signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, a positive indication of the government's progressive inclinations on climate change.
Turkmenistan is currently engaged in talks with Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Iran on environmental protection of the Caspian Sea. These marine environmental protection talks will include discussion of development of the mineral resources of the Caspian seabed and use of the sturgeon population in a way that protects the Caspian ecosystem.

Section 498A(a)(8): "deny support for acts of international terrorism."
The T^km Govt does not grant sanctuary from prosecution to individuals or groups that have committed acts of intl terrorism or otherwise support international terrorism. Turkmenistan has signed two of the twelve international counter-terrorism conventions.

Section 498A(a)(9): "accept responsibility for paying an equitable portion of the indebtedness to U.S. firms incurred by the former Soviet Union."
In July 1992, the T^km Govt signed a "zero option" agreement with Russia under which Russia will pay Turkmenistan's share of the external debt of the FSU in return for Turkmenistan's share of the external assets of the FSU. Please see section 498A(a)(9) of the above Russia assessment regarding indebtedness to the U.S. incurred by the former Soviet Union.

Section 498A(a)(10): "cooperate with the U.S. Government in uncovering all evidence regarding Americans listed as prisoners-of-war, or otherwise missing during American operations, who were detained in the former Soviet Union during the Cold War."
The U.S. Govt's effort to uncover evidence of American POWs and MIAs in the former Soviet Union is being conducted through the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POWs/MIAs that was established in March 1992. In November 1995 the Commission visited Turkmenistan, where it was warmly received by, and received full cooperation from, the T^km Govt.

p 379   Section 498A(a)(11): "terminate support for the communist regime in Cuba, including removal of troops, closing of military and intelligence facilities, including the military and intelligence facilities at Lourdes and Cienfuegos, and ceasing trade subsidies and economic, nuclear, and other assistance."
We have no evidence to indicate that the T^km Govt is providing military, economic, nuclear, or other assistance to Cuba.

TURKMENISTAN CHECKLIST FOR GROUNDS OF INELIGIBILITY UNDER SECTION 498A(b) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961
Section 498A(b)(1): Has the President determined that the T^km Govt has "engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights or of international law"?
No. Nonetheless, the U.S. Govt is deeply concerned about the broad and serious violations of human rights discussed above and continues to make human rights issues a central and consistent element of our dialogue with the T^km Govt. We will work to better address these problems not only through diplomatic efforts but also with our assistance programs.

Section 498A(b)(2): Has the President determined that the T^km Govt "has failed to take constructive actions to facilitate the effective implementation of applicable arms control obligations derived from agreements signed by the former Soviet Union"?
No. We do not believe that the T^km Govt has failed to take such actions.

Section 498A(b)(3): Has the President determined that, after October 24, 1992, the T^km Govt "knowingly transferred to another country
(A) missiles or missile technology inconsistent with the guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime; or
(B) any material, equipment, or technology that would contribute significantly to the ability of such country to manufacture any weapon of mass destruction (including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) if the President determine[d] that the material, equipment, or technology was to be used by such country in the manufacture of such weapon"?
No. We do not believe that the T^km Govt has made such transfers.

Section 498A(b)(4): Is the T^km Govt "prohibited from receiving such assistance by section 101 or 102 of the Arms Export Control Act or sections 306(a)(1) and 307 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991"?
No. We do not have information indicating that the T^km Govt is prohibited by these statutes from receiving such assistance.

Section 498A(b)(5): Has the President determined and certified within 30 days to the appropriate congressional committees that the T^km Govt "is providing assistance for, or engaging in non-market-based trade (as defined in section 498B(k)(3)) with the Cuban Govt? If so, has the President taken action to withhold assistance from Turkmenistan under the Foreign Assistance Act within 30 days of such a determination, or has Congress enacted legislation disapproving the determination within that 30-day period?"
No. We do not have information from which to conclude that the T^km Govt is providing assistance for, or engaging in any non-market-based trade with, the Cuban Govt.

p 394   VI. Assessments required by 1999 Silk Road Strategy Act
amends Foreign Assistance Act of 1960 and was enacted as part of FY2000 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act
p 395   Turkmenistan Negotiations on a Bilateral Investment Treaty between the U.S. Govt & Turkmenistan Govt have been inactive since March 1998, pending action by the T^km Govt. The State Department is not aware of any outstanding investment disputes involving U.S. citizens and the T^km Govt.
p 100   Overview of U.S. Govt Assistance
As in previous years, the mixed results of U.S. Govt-funded assistance programs in Turkmenistan in FY2000 reflected President Niyazov's refusal to permit broad-based economic or political reform. As a result, U.S. Govt-funded assistance to Turkmenistan was increasingly directed toward people-to-people programs such as training and exchanges. In FY 2000, the U.S. Govt provided an estimated $16.56 million in assistance to Turkmenistan, including $6.19 million in FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) assistance, $4.70 million in other U.S. Govt assistance, and $5.66 million in U.S. Defense Department excess and privately donated humanitarian commodities. The U.S. Govt sought to expand Turkmenistan's private sector and strengthen the entrepreneurial skills of Turkmen citizens. USAID's private-sector development programs, which provide credit, technical expertise and training, increasingly targeted small and medium-sized enterprises. To facilitate the growth of small, competitive businesses, USAID initiated a micro-credit program. The objectives of USAID's modest-sized democracy programs in Turkmenistan were to encourage citizen participation, foster democratic concepts, and facilitate access to information. USAID pursued these objectives by supporting the efforts of non-govtal organizations (NGOs) in the areas of civic and legal education, as well as community development and self-help activities. U.S. Govt-funded humanitarian assistance was targeted at vulnerable groups such as the elderly, the disabled and disaster victims. Training, Exchange and Educational Reform Programs

Since FY 1993, U.S. Govt-funded exchange programs have brought almost 1,000 Turkmen citizens to the U.S. for short-term professional or long-term academic training, including some 110 in FY 2000 alone. These programs give participants an opportunity to develop their skills and establish valuable contacts with U.S. counterparts. USAID Training Programs: FY2000 USAID's Global Training for Development (GTD) Project conducted a total of 31 programs for 426 Turkmen participants: four U.S.-based programs for a total of 9 participants; 15 third-country programs for a total of 44 participants and 12 in-country programs for a total of 373 participants. Training topics included oil-spill response, oil and gas regulation, NGO-sector development, asset liability management and bank supervision.
State Dept Public Diplomacy Exchanges
In FY 2000, approximately 70 Turkmen citizens participated in academic and professional exchange programs administered by the U.S. Embassy's Public Affairs Section in collaboration with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), including 38 high school students, six undergraduates students and twelve graduate students. Five Turkmen teachers and two U.S. teachers participated in the Teaching Excellency Awards Program, which was introduced in Turkmenistan in FY 2000. Under this program, 22 Turkmen schools received much- needed computer equipment and materials. In addition, nine Turkmen citizens participated in International Visitor (IV) programs focusing on topics ranging from the U.S. judicial system to water resource management. The Future Leaders' Exchange (FLEX) Program for secondary school students continued to be one of the most popular U.S. Govt-funded programs, with over 1,000 applying this year for a very limited number of slots.

State Dept NIS College/University Partnership Program
Since Sept. 1998, ECA Bureau has been supporting a university partnership between Texas A&M University and Turkmen State University (TSU) that aims to create an world-class business school at TSU by developing faculty expertise, curricula, classroom infrastructure and short-term business training programs for professionals. Over the past several years, this project has experienced difficulties due to interference by the Turkmen Govt.
Specifically, President Niyazov refused to approve entering classes of students in fall 1998 & fall 1999 and recommended a shorter curriculum. The original class of 50 students nevertheless continues to study and will graduate this spring. To address the admissions approval problem, U.S. & Turkmen partner institutions are considering instituting shorter applied business curricula for college graduates and further developing their coursework for professionals, 2 areas that the Turkmen Govt supports. In the meantime, the partnership has focused heavily on faculty exchanges. 8 Turkmen instructors have been trained at Texas A&M, and Texas faculty have made numerous trips to TSU. Both faculties are extremely dedicated to the project and have made significant progress, including substantial improvements to classroom workspace. The project has established a fully equipped computer lab with Internet capabilities, overhead projectors, a copying machine, and numerous U.S. textbooks translated into Russian & Turkmen.

p 101   USDA Cochran Fellowship Program
FY2000, USDA's Cochran Pgm provided two-week training for 13 Turkmen agricultural specialists, including private farmers and govt officials, in the areas of agricultural marketing, water management, plant protection and pesticide management.
SABIT Commerce Dept Special American Business Internship Pgm
FY2000, SABIT Pgm provided short-term internships for 6 Turkmen participants

USAID Economic Restructuring Programs
For past several years, the U.S. Govt had sought to encourage the Turkmen Govt to restructure and reduce its role in the national economy, prerequisite for increased private-sector growth and intl trade & investment in Turkmenistan. To this end, USAID was providing technical assistance aimed at creating sound fiscal, trade and investment policies, management practices, and better commercial & business laws. However, due to the paucity of results from these efforts, USAID has closed out its technical assistance programs dealing with trade & investment and privatization. The lack of success in promoting economic restructuring in Turkmenistan has also called into question donors' expectations regarding the development of an efficient, competitive private sector. Given these concerns, USAID is changing the focus of its private-sector support activities to target younger entrepreneurs and smaller and newer businesses.

CAAEF Central Asian - American Enterprise Fund
FY2000 CAAEF continued to provide financing to private Turkmen businesses and training to bank & borrower-institution personnel in financial analysis & forecasting. The CAAEF also made its largest single investment in Turkmenistan, a cotton-spinning factory that currently employs more than 400 workers, almost 80% of them women. From 1996 through the end of FY2000, CAAEF approved approximately $8.4 million in loans and investments. In addition, the CAAEF also implemented a micro-credit program that approved $300,000 in loans to 15 borrowers. The CAAEF also restructured its two large investments, bringing the total financing it has provided in Turkmenistan since 1996 to almost $9 million. Although there were a few promising economic reforms in FY 2000, namely, the repeal of a 20% tax on hard-currency purchases and a reduction of social security taxes to 20%, the currency conversion issue remains a problem for the Fund and its Turkmen borrowers, many of whom have fallen into arrears or delinquency as a result. These developments led the CAAEF to suspend further lending Aug. 2000 until currency conversion problem is resolved.
USAID Micro-Credit Program
Under a grant from USAID, Mercy Corps International (MCI) initiated a micro-credit program targeting small businesses with a high growth potential. The program approved $290,000 in loans of up to $25,000. Despite currency conversion delays, all but one loan was repaid as expected.
USAID Private-Sector Support Programs
FY2000, the International Executive Service Corps (IESC) office in Turkmenistan implemented 18 USAID- supported private-sector projects in the areas of food processing, publishing, agricultural development, retail sales, banking and business education. Volunteer U.S. executives directly assisted small and medium-sized private businesses, increasing their understanding of a market-based economic system, building their technical capacity and introducing them to basic management techniques and financial analysis skills. IESC also provided business information services and organized site visits for U.S. firms. IESC's work with private entrepreneurs and commercial banks resulted in an upgrading of business standards in Turkmenistan, thus contributing to the development of private enterprise. IESC volunteers lectured at several of the economics and business faculties at Turkmenistan's universities. In addition, IESC helped carry out an assessment of a private business school in the Dashoguz Region.

FTF USAID Farmer-to-Farmer Program
In FY 2000, Winrock International fielded 14 U.S. volunteers on 11 FTF assignments, providing assistance to more than 2,000 Turkmen farmers and entrepreneurs. FTF volunteers worked on issues such as on-farm production, association development, water management and civil-society development. Winrock volunteers also helped establish six rural associations of private farmers that operate as self-governed cooperatives. These cooperatives have a total membership of just under 300 and are involved in water resources management and various types of crop production and processing. The establishment of these six rural cooperatives is a major achievement: they provide a unique and much-needed alternative to the collapsing system of state-run collective farms. In addition to improving members' skills in association development and water resource management, FTF volunteers assisted their Turkmen counterparts with horticulture production, milk processing, mushroom production, and honey production and processing.

USAID Budget Reform Programs
Despite a general phase-out of technical assistance to the central govt in the area of economic reform, USAID continued to support budget reform efforts for the time being, given the continuing involvement of other donors. The Turkmen Govt demonstrated a certain degree of commitment to budget reform in FY 2000. The Ministry of Economy and Finance adopted internationally recognized financial and accounting classifications and coding, and upgraded the analytical and computer capabilities of its budget department. The number of agency budgets and autonomous funds now included in the budget documents submitted to the Turkmen Parliament has substantially increased, although the Ministry's management control still remains weak. The importance of improved national financial management is clearly recognized by the other donors as well. The World Bank and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) are supporting programs that complement the U.S. Govt's efforts in this area.

USAID Energy-Sector Programs
FY2000 USAID-funded advisers continued to promote the development of an effective regulatory framework for Turkmenistan's oil and gas sector by facilitating the implementation of the country's newly adopted oil and gas rules and regulations, organizing workshops and study tours to enhance the capabilities of regulatory agencies, and promoting international standards and practices. The advisors drafted a pipeline law to promote the development of a modern legal and regulatory framework for Turkmenistan's pipeline transportation sector, including a tariff methodology based on the cost of services. USAID also funded a comprehensive audit of Turkmenistan's deteriorating oil and gas education and research activities and recommended strategies to bring them up to international standards.

Democracy Programs
IATP State Dept Internet Access & Training Pgmrogram (IATP): providing access to and training in the use of the Internet, primarily to alumni of U.S. Govt-funded exchange programs. The IATP site in Turkmenistan is administered by the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX).

Democracy Fund Small Grants Pgm
U.S. Embassy's Democracy Commission was launched with great success in FY 2000. The Commission received 43 applications from small initiative groups and awarded 18 small grants totaling approximately $100,000. Projects supported by the Commission focused on topics such as civic education, the free flow of information, women's issues, community self-help, democratic institution-building, and education in free-market concepts, and included an Internet café run by a youth group, a series of business seminars for disabled citizens, a teacher resource center, an ecological camp teaching civic responsibility and leadership skills, a series of journalism workshops, and a regional NGO conference that will result in the development of a regional network of NGOs.

USAID NGO Development Programs
In FY 2000, Turkmenistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs granted official accreditation to the Counterpart Consortium, a U.S.-based NGO that is implementing a USAID-funded NGO support initiative for Central Asia. Counterpart was the first international organization to gain this status in Turkmenistan, reflecting the Turkmen Govt's reluctant consent to continued civil-society development. Counterpart's assistance strategy takes into account the lack of an enabling environment for NGO development and the Turkmen Govt's suspicious attitude towards NGOs. Counterpart's programs focus on the following areas:

•   regional outreach, including a program that builds the skills of a local water users' association to manage the delivery system of clean water to rural communities served by a USAID-built reverse osmosis water plant in Turkmenbashi Etrap in Dashoguz Province;
•   educating the public and govt about the role of NGOs, in conjunction with its partner organization, the International Center for Not-For-ProfitLaw (ICNL);
•   promoting social partnership through activities designed to establish dialogue between local govts and NGOs;
•   hosting an NGO donor subgroup to encourage partnerships and channel intl donor resources to deserving NGOs; and
•   assuming a lower profile in NGO development, thus encouraging Turkmen NGOs to take the lead in this process. Over 1,500 members of some 200 Turkmen NGOs and civic groups participated in Counterpart training programs in FY 2000, bringing the cumulative number of participants in these programs to 2,500.

USAID Rule-of-Law Programs
FY2000, the American Bar Association's USAID-funded Central and East European Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI) helped establish the first-ever Law Students' Association at the University of Turkmenistan, which now represents 50 percent of the country's law students. The Association continues to increase its membership and is therefore in a position to become a sustainable, professional organization with a strong leadership core. ABA/CEELI's Advocacy Skills Program helped law students become successful junior advocates and win honors at regional competitions. For example, in August 2000, the Turkmen State University team won awards for best overall team, best oral advocates, and best written argument at the Central Asian Debate Championship in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. These law students are now using their new skills in outreach programs throughout Turkmenistan, conducting a series of ABA/CEELI-funded "street law" workshops in all 5 velayats (regions). Through these workshops, ABA/CEELI has brought legal and civic education to thousands of Turkmen secondary school students.

State Dept Law Enforcement Training
As Turkmenistan continues to be a popular transit country for drug traffickers, U.S. Govt-funded law enforcement training has increasingly focused on increasing the country's counter-narcotics capabilities. In addition, the U.S. Govt provided assistance and training for police academy instructors, major criminal case investigators and other law enforcement officials.

Security Programs
EXBS State Dept Export Control & Related Border Security Program
FY2000 U.S. State Dept allocated $485,000 under the EXBS Program to help Turkmenistan develop its nonproliferation capabilities. This assistance was focused on enhancing the Turkmen Govt's capabilities to interdict illicit trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, dual-use weapons and weapons-related materials. This is a particular concern in Turkmenistan, which lies along centuries-old trade and smuggling routes running both north- south and east-west. The U.S. Govt also proposed that Turkmenistan participate in the EXBS-funded Central Asian Regional Communications Link, which will strengthen intra-govtal coordination on border security, and will help Turkmenistan and its neighbors tighten control over trafficking of illegal narcotics and the movement of international terrorists.

Regional Security & Stability Programs
FY2000, Turkmenistan's Ministry of Defense continued to maintain a consistent, but low-profile relationship with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Turkmenistan received $313,000 in assistance under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program and $600,000 in Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Under the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) Program, the Govt of Turkmenistan received an 82-foot U.S. Coast Guard patrol boat that will enable Turkmenistan's maritime border guard to improve its nonproliferation and export control capabilities. In addition, the U.S. Govt continued to provi de counter-narcotics training to Turkmenistan's border guards, and follow-on training visits are scheduled for FY2001.

p 104   Social-Sector & Humanitarian Assistance
USAID Health Care Pgms
FY2000, USAID continued its efforts to improve health care in Turkmenistan through health partnerships, reproductive health programs, and the surveillance and treatment of tuberculosis and other infectious diseases. With support from USAID, Abt Associates organized a regional conference in Ashgabat on the results of health care reform in Central Asia. Wherever possible, USAID sought to partner Turkmen Govt agencies with NGOs in the provision of social services.

Health Partnerships
Since its launching in FY 1999, the USAID-funded partnership between Turkmenistan's Ministry of Health and the Univ. of N.Dakota has made progress in the area of retraining Ashgabat's family physicians in primary health care. U.S. & Turkmen partners have identified training needs and designed a training curriculum that meets those needs. Through this partnership, the Ashgabat Emergency Services Training Center continued to upgrade the skills of the country's emergency service staff and to serve as a model for similar health partnerships elsewhere in Central Asia.
Infectious Disease Programsbr> With USAID support, the CDC continued to work with Turkmenistan's Ministry of Health to improve the Ministry's infectious disease control, prevention and surveillance systems. In FY 2000, CDC helped set up a tuberculosis reference laboratory and a hepatitis laboratory. Through CDC & Project HOPE, USAID initiated a Direct Observed Short Course Therapy (DOTS) tuberculosis pilot program in Ashgabat.
HIV/AIDS Pgm With USAID support, UN AIDS Pgm (UNAIDS) began a syndromic management pgm for family physicians in rural areas.

Reproductive Health Pgm
Counterpart Consortium initiated a project to strengthen the capacity of Turkmen NGOs to work with local communities on reproductive health activities. In addition, Macro Intl collected data from 9,000 Turkmen women for a USAID-funded demographic health survey on reproductive health, which will help USAID target future assistance in this area.
CHAP Counterpart Humanitarian Assistance Pgm
FY2000, with support from USAID, CHAP started providing support for a national tuberculosis program, strengthening the delivery of health care services in the Aral Sea ecological disaster area and delivering shipments directly to Turkmenistan's five velayats (districts). CHAP also delivered two 40-foot containers of humanitarian daily rations and is planning to deliver the first shipment of wheelchairs to Turkmenistan's Coalition of NGOs. CHAP has started to diversify the humanitarian commodities that it transports to Turkmenistan. To date, CHAP has delivered 71 shipments consisting of various medical equip& supplies for the Ministry of Health and Medical Industry, incl clothing, footwear, humanitarian daily rations, bedding, cloth, and emergency items worth approximately $10 million.

Operation Provide Hope, State Dept
FY2000, Humanitarian Pgms Div. of the Office of Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to NIS expended approximately $400,000 to deliver $5.66 million in humanitarian commodities to Turkmenistan. These commodities were distributed by Counterpart Intl.
USDA Food Aid
FY2000, USDA allocated $1.23 million for the provision of food commodities to Turkmenistan as part of the American Red Cross's Aral Sea Regional Pgm $389,000 through USDA's Section 416(b) Program and $844,000 through its Food for Progress Program. The beneficiaries of this assistance included 18,000 isolated elderly, orphans, invalids and families with special needs in the Dashoguz Region.

Cross-Sectoral Programs
Eurasia Foundation FY2000 Eurasia Fdtn continued to operate a small-grants program in Turkmenistan, awarding approximately $38,400 in grants to Turkmen NGOs in the area of private-enterprise development.
p 105   Peace Corps
As of end of FY2000, there were 64 Peace Corps volunteers in Turkmenistan: 18 in the health sector, focusing on community, maternal and child health; 41 teaching English as a foreign language, English-language teaching methodologies, and English for special purposes; and five in business education. A total of 54 new Peace Corps trainees arrived in Turkmenistan at the end of FY 2000: 7 in business education, 18 in English-language education, and 29 in community health education. In addition, the Peace Corps' Small Project Assistance (SPA) Program funded 7 community-based projects implemented by Peace Corps volunteers, including the installation of a school heating system, the establishment of an English language and computer resource center, 2 anemia prevention projects, two English-language-immersion summer camps and a methodology conference for female teachers. Peace Corps volunteers worked with other U.S. Govt assistance providers, including the U.S. Embassy's Public Affairs Section, Counterpart Intl, Aid to Artisans, as well as with other donors, to identify and support local Turkmen initiatives to develop community resources.

Pgms promoting 1999 Silk Road Strategy Act (SRSA) objectives
FY2000, promoting reconciliation & recovery from regional conflicts; fostering economic growth & development; promoting infrastructure development; increasing border control capabilities; and promoting democracy, tolerance, and the development of civil society.

Preview of FY 2001 Pgms
Given the Turkmen Govt's continued refusal to permit broad-based economic and political reform, the U.S. Govt will place an even greater emphasis on assistance programs targeting Turkmenistan's next generation of leaders. To this end, the U.S. Govt intends to expand its exchange programs & training activities, on the premise that, dollar for dollar, these programs offer the greatest return on the U.S. Govt's investment, as far as promoting Turkmenistan's long-term development is concerned. The U.S.Embassy will continue to monitor ongoing U.S. Govt- funded assistance programs in Turkmenistan and reduce those that are producing little or no sustainable results. U.S. Govt-funded assistance will continue to support the improved delivery of health care services, the development of civil society and the rule of law, and private-sector growth. In conjunction with other donors, including the UNDP & World Bank, U.S. Govt may also continue to provide assistance with budget reform.

USAID will expand its assistance in the areas of reproductive health and infectious disease surveillance and control, with an emphasis on hepatitis and the Directly Observed Therapy Short Course (DOTS) tuberculosis control program. USAID also expects to continue its support for training family physicians and providing reproductive health education. Whenever possible, USAID's health-related activities will continue to partner civic & community-based organizations with Turkmen Govt health services.
U.S. Govt-funded assistance in the area of democracy-building will focus on illustrating that civic organizations can work in partnership with govt services for the benefit of the communities they serve. Proposed rule-of-law activities will include assistance in strengthening the professionalism & ethical practices of lawyers and providing increased access for citizens & officials to Turkmen and intl legislation. USAID's private-sector support programs will focus on smaller-scale enterprises and activities promoting entrepreneurial development. USAID anticipates supporting a micro-credit program and business training & education in collaboration with the U.S. Embassy's Public Affairs Section, the Peace Corps and intl donors.

p 130   STRATEGIC ASSISTANCE AREA 1: ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING
Goal: To foster the emergence of a competitive, market-oriented economy in which the majority of economic resources are privately owned and managed

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1.1: The increased transfer of state-owned enterprises to the private sector
This objective entails USAID support for the transfer of public enterprises and other state-owned assets (e.g., land, housing stock, financial institutions and utilities) to private ownership and management. Areas of emphasis include the following:

•   Policy, legislative and regulatory actions to facilitate and provide confidence in privatization;
•   Technical assistance, training and policy advice to strengthen local institutional capabilities to manage privatization programs;
•   Assistance in organizing and financing privatization arrangements (e.g., mass privatization, auctions, competitive tenders, and employee ownership);
•   Assistance in providing public education on privatization; and
•   Post-privatization assistance as part of a continuum of privatization assistance for specific-owned enterprises.

p133   STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1.2: Increased soundness of fiscal policies & fiscal management practices
Fiscal reform efforts also continued in Turkmenistan, with modest gains in tax collection
p 136   Policy, Legal and Regulatory Reform Programs
In contrast, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan provide little encouragement to private commercial activity, with no positive movement to improve the policy/legal environment.
p 137   Business Development Programs
The Central Asian - American Enterprise Fund (CAAEF), which promotes the creation of small and medium-sized business in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, has to date made $29 million in small and medium-sized loans, of which $14 million has been repaid. The CAAEF invested an additional $3.6 million in micro- lending programs in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
p 142   Capital Markets
USAID has no capital market development efforts in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Belarus or Azerbaijan. In the other NIS countries, the programs are ongoing or are close to ending, with results along a continuum from Armenia to Kazakhstan.
p 144   In Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, the prerequisites for a capital market are not yet in place; therefore USAID is not expending effort at this time in developing capital markets in these 3 countries.

p 146   STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1.5: A more economically sound & environmentally sustainable energy sector
Oil and Gas Development
USAID has continued to support the development of modern, Western legal and regulatory regimes in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Georgia and Ukraine.

p 148   STRATEGIC ASSISTANCE AREA 2: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
Goal: To support the transition to transparent and accountable governance in political and economic decision-making.
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2.1: Increased, better informed citizen participation in political and economic decision-making.
This objective encompasses USAID assistance directed towards strengthening systems of democratic representation and open information, developing an informed citizenry, and encouraging citizen participation through effective non-govtal advocacy and community groups. These programs seek to increase citizens' influence on public policy decisions, and improve govt oversight. Illustrative activities include:

•   Promoting free and fair elections;
•   Supporting political party development;
•   Supporting the development of independent, responsible media;
•   Increasing the breadth, vitality, and impact of civic associations and NGOs concerned with public policy, human rights, service provision, and environmental management; and
•   Strengthening independent, representative labor unions.

U.S.-Russian young leadership fellows for public service (FSA-funded)
The U.S.-Russian Young Leadership Fellows for Public Service Program began in FY 1999 as an initiative to provide practical experience in developing personal leadership skills and promoting the importance of community responsibility for young Russian and American students. The program enriches the experience and education of young people who show the promise of contributing to the betterment of their own countries and to increased mutual understanding between the two countries. The program combines academic course-work with complementary community service and an internship, and targets Russian and American college graduates who have demonstrated leadership skills and an interest in public service. The program provides full scholarships for one year of non-degree study in the U.S. or Russia at qualified universities and colleges. The Russian and American students have different but complementary program designs. Russian students select a concentration in either Community Affairs, Govtal Affairs, or Corporate Affairs. American students focus on Russian Studies. In August 2000, 47 Russian and 18 Americans began their year-long program.
Edm. S. MUSKIE FSA Graduate fellowship program
NIS graduate students & professionals for one to two years of study in U.S. master's degree programs … recruited through an open, merit-based competition administered by the American Councils for International Education (ACIE, formerly known as ACTR/ACCELS) and the Open Society Institute (OSI). … There are typically at least ten times more applicants than available Muskie/FSA fellowships in most NIS countries.
Contemporary Issues Fellowship Pgm
p 174   Of these 77 finalists, … two from Turkmenistan,

p 185   SABIT U.S. Commerce Dept special american business internship training pgm
Provides managers & scientists from the NIS with practical exposure to American methods of innovation & management by placing them with U.S. companies for hands-on training for 4 weeks to 6 months. FY 2000 training pgms completed this fiscal year incl
Alumni Activities
A SABIT host company has started General Motors (GM) car dealerships in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Krasnoyarsk, Russia with its SABIT alumni. After surviving the 1998 Russian financial crisis and training several business partners through the SABIT Program, a Virginia-based dealership has generated multi-million- dollar profits. This same organization sold a fleet of American-made GM trucks to a large gold/uranium mining and processing plant in Uzbekistan.
A Virginia-based company has won a $30,000 contract from the Ministry of Defense in Turkmenistan for the delivery of American auto parts. Thanks to the SABIT Program, the company has been able to establish its presence in Turkmenistan and succeed despite the difficult economic situation there.

DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS
p 191   U.S. State Dept Bureau Of European Affairs
Public Affairs Sections of U.S. Embassies in the NIS countries administer the Democracy Funds Small-Grants Program and other programs which provide support for democracy building activities by local organizations and institutions. FY 2000 is 6th year of this high-impact small-grants pgm, under which embassy-based Democracy Commissions in each NIS country award grants of up to $24,000 to indigenous NGOs or individuals in support of democracy-building activities, independent media and the free flow of information. In FY 2000, the Democracy Funds Small-Grants Program awarded over 330 grants with a total value of approximately $3.5 million; Turkmenistan 18 $100,000
FY 2000 marks the launch of the Democracy Fund Small Grants program in Tajikistan &Turkmenistan. Opening projects in Tajikistan included awards to promote the formation and development of independent political parties, to support the establishment of a Center for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights, and to enable publication of a newspaper with independent reporting and analysis. Opening projects in Turkmenistan addressed such issues as: working with youth at risk, low-income women, legislative advocacy, and the development of small business training programs.

p 194   State Dept ACTTA Anti-Crime Training & Technical Assistance
established by State Dept's INL Bureau for Intl Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs late FY1994 in response to the threat posed to U.S. national security by transnational organized crime and related activities, including narcotics production and trafficking, in Russia and all the New Independent States (NIS) and the former Soviet Bloc. … coordinates programs conducted by more than 19 U.S. federal law enforcement agencies in 10 NIS countries (excluding Azerbaijan and Belarus). Focal point of ACTTA's regional law enforcement assistance efforts is the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest, established in 1995. FY2000 72 NIS participants attended ILEA's core pgm 8 week mid-level management course, along with colleagues from other Eastern European countries and 270 NIS law enforcement officials participated in specialized courses at ILEA. FY2000, INL Bureau provided $286,042 in Freedom Support Act funds to cover ILEA's operating expenses. INL Bureau awarded $883,698 to 9 law enforcement agencies to conduct specialized training and participate in the core courses at ILEA in FY 2000.
p 196   Turkmenistan
FY2000 INL funded $575,168 in training to Turkmen law enforcement officials in drug enforcement (incl forensic chemist training), anti-corruption, community policing, and law enforcement development. The INL Bureau also funded an intermittent financial advisor, and provided assistance to the U.S. Embassy in Ashgabat by funding a PSC to assist in managing INL programs.

p 239   U.S. Defense Dept Counterproliferation Programs
Under separate legislative acts in FY 1995 and FY 1997, the U.S. Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement, in collaboration with the U.S. Customs Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), two counterproliferation initiatives to provide training and technical assistance to NIS law enforcement, customs and border guard personnel. These two programs-the DoD/FBI Counterproliferation Program and the DoD/U.S. Customs Service (USCS) Counterproliferation Program-are coordinated with the U.S. Department of State, specifically the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program and the Anti-Crime Training and Technical Assistance (ACTTA) Program, and are implemented by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and other agencies.
p 241   U.S. Defense Dept & State Dept Warsaw Initiative / Partnership For Peace
In July 1994, the Administration requested $100 million from the U.S. Congress to help America's new democratic partners work with us to advance the goals of the Partnership for Peace. The U.S. Govt's Warsaw Initiative was intended to jump-start Partnership for Peace (PFP) participation with an infusion of readily-available funds. … Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy & Threat Reduction) are responsible for policy oversight of the Warsaw Initiative program for the NIS. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency administers Warsaw Initiative funds.
p 242   Most PFP member-states are eligible to receive Warsaw Initiative assistance. Eligible NIS states incl Turkmenistan. Tajikistan is currently not a member of PFP.
U.S. State Dept Partnership for Peace (PFP) Initiative
State Dept provides Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds, implemented through the U.S. Department of Defense, to PFP partner countries for the acquisition of U.S. defense articles and services. 8 NIS countries incl Turkmenistan received FY2000 FMF funding

p 250   U.S. CRDF Civilian R&D Fdtn
CRDF funds U.S.-NIS collaboration on civilian basic & applied research conducted in the NIS in order to redirect efforts of former weapons scientists toward peaceful purposes and promote the development of market economies in the NIS. CRDF is a non-govtal, non-profit foundation est. 8.95 by National Science Foundation with an initial $5 million grant under the U.S. Defense Dept's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, matched by a $5 million grant from the Soros Foundation. FY1996, funding for much of the CRDF's activities shifted to the U.S.
State Dept FREEDOM Support Act (FSA). Funds received by the CRDF are committed to its Cooperative Research Grants (CRG) competition, a "NextSteps to the Market" Program, Travel Grant Program (TGP), Regional Equipment Scientific Centers (RESC) Program and contract support programs. In May 2000, CRDF and NIH jointly hosted an International Symposium in Moscow to highlight 5 of the most successful and promising U.S.-NIS scientist team presentations, including a team from former BW facility in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan and a team from the State Research Center for Applied Virology and Biotechnology (Vector) in Russia.
Cooperative Grants Program
FY2000, CRDF second round of CGP Cooperative Grants pgm multidisciplinary competition for collaborative US- NIS research grants. Over 1,200 proposals, 199 projects selected for grants, totaling nearly $10 million. Av. $50,000 over 18 months
p 253   Turkmenistan
CRDF committed $65,600 to collaborative research project on imperiled sturgeon with Turkmenistan under Cooperative Grants Program. It also funded participation in a DOC Commercialization seminar in Tashkent by a Turkmen scientist offering mathematical methods for improving natural gas prospecting

p 254   State Dept Export Control And Related Border Security Assistance
p 256   Turkmenistan
USCG excess 82-foot patrol to boat was transferred to Turkmenistan under the DoD Excess Defense Articles (EDA) Program, facilitating Turkmenistan's maritime border security. The vessel is currently in Turkey awaiting final transit to Turkmenistan in Spring 2001. One Turkmen participant completed the USCG's IMET-funded International Maritime Officers' Course (IMOC) from October-December 1999.

p 262   State Dept Peacekeeping Operations
PKO funds support the U.S. national interest in promoting human rights, democracy, and regional security and facilitating humanitarian response. U.S. Govt contributed FY2000 $2.2 million to peacekeeping operations in NIS in FY 2000. Turkmenistan
PKO funds facilitated contacts and information exchange with OSCE institutions.

p 279   U.S. Dept of Interior MMS Minerals Management Service
CPRC Caspian Partnership for Regulatory Cooperation
Since FY1999, MMS providing USAID-funded technical assistance to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Georgia as they continue their efforts to implement legislative and regulatory reforms with the long-term goal of establishing transparent oil and gas regulatory institutions through technical assistance workshops, regulatory partnerships, and on-site shadow training. Most assistance has been planned & performed in conjunction with other USAID funded contractors; namely, Hagler-Bailly, Inc. for the technical assistance work and the U.S. Energy Association (USEA) for regulatory partnership activities.
Turkmenistan
Technical Assistance Workshops   Aug. 2000, a fourth technical assistance workshop was held in Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan. The workshop addressed the importance of assessing environmental information and impacts to ensure operations are conducted in an environmentally sound and safe manner. Part of the workshop utilized a mock exploration plan by a fictional company with Turkmenistan's new regulations as the legal framework by which it was introduced. MMS Representatives acted in different roles from company executive, to environmental consulting firm, to the Govt of Turkmenistan. The Turkmen audience was drawn from govtal ministries, state companies, international operators involved in Turkmenistan, and members of the environmental NGO community.
Regulatory Partnership Activities   Nov. 1999, MMS Gulf of Mexico Regional Staff hosted regulatory officials from Turkmenistan as part of the U.S. Energy Association's Caspian Environmental Partnership Program. The roundtable discussions with the Turkmen included: environmental impact analysis and monitoring; offshore plans, permits, applications, and inspections; and production and development permits and conservation issues.
On-Site Shadow Training   July & Aug. 2000, MMS Gulf of Mexico Regional Staff hosted two senior Turkmen offshore inspectors for training on the MMS inspection program. During the course of the training the two were provided an introduction to all facets of regional and district level operations. As part of this, the 2 Turkmen inspectors shadowed Houma and New Orleans District Inspectors on four separate trip offshore to inspect platforms.

p 283   USDA Food Assistance Programs
FY2000 USDA provided almost $333 million in humanitarian food aid and concessional loans to the NIS countries, consisting of approximately $110 million in govt-to-govt food aid grants, $84 million in concessional food aid loans, and over $139 million in targeted direct feeding and food aid monetization programs implemented by U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs). In addition, USDA provided a total of $50 million in export credit guarantees to the NIS countries under its export credit guarantee programs (GSM-102 and Supplier Credit Guarantee Program)
p 284   Turkmenistan
FY2000, USDA allocated $1.3 million for the provision of approximately 2,000 MT of food commodities to Turkmenistan. As part of the American Red Cross's Aral Sea Region Program, Turkmenistan received food aid under USDA's Food for Progress program for support of direct-feeding initiatives in the Aral Sea region. The beneficiaries of this assistance included 18,000 isolated elderly, orphans, invalids and families with special needs in the Tasauz Region.

p 286   State Dept Coordinator's Office Humanitarian Assistance
Humanitarian Programs Division of the Office of the Coordinator of U.S Assistance to the NIS (S/NIS/C) coordinating & facilitating delivery of emergency & transitional humanitarian assistance to NIS by 16 U.S. Govt agencies, as well as for coordinating U.S. Govt humanitarian assistance efforts with other donor countries and several international organizations. FY2000 Operation Provide Hope, Coordinator's Office expended approx. $16.1 million to deliver over $221.5 million in privately donated and U.S. Defense Dept excess humanitarian commodities to targeted groups in greatest need within the NIS. Working closely with numerous U.S. private volunteer organizations (PVOs), contracted freight forwarders and various U.S. Govt agencies, the Coordinator's Office also funded several emergency and transitional humanitarian programs.
p 392   HP Div. exercised "notwithstanding authority" to award non-competitive follow-on grants to the following U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs) to provide continued emergency & transitional assistance to the NIS countries: Counterpart International, CitiHope, United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR), Heart-to-Heart, International Relief & Development (IRD), Project Hope, A Call to Serve, Eaton-Hap and the World Council of Hellenes.
p 297   Turkmenistan

p 302   PEACE CORPS
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Peace Corps was invited to send Volunteers into 8 NIS countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) to help facilitate their transition to market-oriented democracies. In the Spring of 2001, Peace Corps is planning to send its first group of Volunteers into the Republic of Georgia. In responding to these requests, Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) have helped overcome the historically limited contact between U.S. & NIS communities, and have established and strengthened new bonds of friendship & cross-cultural understanding by addressing issues of mutual concern at the grass-roots level one community at a time.
p 304   FY 2000 Peace Corps Programs in the NIS: FY 2000 Peace Corps Programs in the NIS: Turkmenistan
Teaching English as a Foreign Language, Community Health Education, Business Education & Micro- Enterprise Development
p 305   SPA Small Projects Assistance Pgm
Peace Corps SPA awards small community grants in support of Peace Corps volunteer (PCV)-implemented activities that help strengthen civic organizations, small businesses, educational institutions and NGOs. In addition to the grants, SPA also provides resources and support for technical assistance to bolster the capacity building skills of host-country citizens in the areas of technical expertise, community and NGO development and small project design and management. FY2000 230 grants totaling $433,250 av. $1,900, ranged from $200 to $7,000 per activity, and furthered the goal of host- country sustainability by requiring significant local contributions to the approved activities. As in prior years, majority of SPA-funded activities in FY 2000 were in the area of education, particularly assisting community schools to enhance their educational resource centers and upgrade their libraries and language learning laboratories to include computer, photocopy and AV equipt.
p 306   Turkmenistan
9 grants in education, primarily to support English-language educational camps (5 grants); and health (4 grants) promoting locally organized health and hygiene awareness activities.

p 307   CDP U.S.-Israel Cooperative Development Program
USAID-supported CDP est.1988 to fund the delivery of Israeli technical assistance & training to address a broad range of developing-country assistance requirements for which Israeli expertise was considered particularly well-suited. In 1992, a special initiative for Central Asia (CDP/CAR) extended program operations to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, with CDP/CAR coverage extended to Georgia in 1993. CDP provides U.S. funds for activities of MASHAV, the development assistance unit of the Govt of Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The program is implemented by MASHAV as part of its own foreign assistance portfolio. Proposed activities may be based on requests from the host countries, or identified by MASHAV or USAID. Given Israel's expertise and experience, the principal focus of the program is agriculture and related areas, with an emphasis on soil and water management, intensive livestock husbandry and vegetable production, irrigation systems management, and farm management. The program has been implemented primarily through training courses, consultancies, and demonstration farms. More recently, the CDP has emphasized agricultural economics and the development of sustainable private sector enterprises.The FY 2000 budget for CDP/CAR was approximately $ 1.4 million, with USAID contributing two-thirds and MASHAV contributing one-third of that total. Emphasis on dairy production continued. In keeping with the program's increased emphasis on privatization and the economic feasibility of agricultural technologies, MASHAV operated CDP-funded Agribusiness Centers in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia. They were staffed with visiting Israeli experts and local professional coordinators who assisted private farmers with their business plans and provided them with information on markets and technologies. In FY 2001, the CDP block grant approach, providing U.S. core funds for MASHAV activities in the region is being phased out in favor of a new, more effective partnership between MASHAV and USAID based in the field. MASHAV has been developing projects directly with the USAID Regional Mission in Central Asia, which is responsible for the U.S. assistance strategy in the region.
CDR U.S.-Israel Cooperative Development Research Pgm
USAID-funded CDR est. 1985 to support joint applied research projects involving Israeli scientists and their counterparts in developing countries, allowing them to work on significant problems facing the developing countries. In 1992, a special initiative extended the program to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia. This initiative focuses on research in arid lands agriculture, an area of Israeli strength and particular need in Central Asia, and includes projects in water management and environmental protection as well as agronomy and livestock management.

p 308   U.S. support for international financial institutions
3 intl financial institutions most active in the region, IMF, World Bank and EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction & Development (EBRD) played key role in the aftermath of the Aug. 1998 Russian financial crisis.
p 309   EBRD est. 3.91 to support market-oriented economic reform and democratic pluralism in Central & Eastern Europe, including the NIS. All 12 NIS countries are members of the EBRD. EBRD is unique among multilateral development banks in its private-sector focus and inclusion of political conditionality, which requires borrowing countries to be committed to multi-party, pluralistic, democratic govt. According to its charter, the EBRD is required to devote 60 percent of its total resources to private-sector projects.
p 310   U.S. 11% share in the EBRD and is its largest single shareholder. U.S. contributions to the EBRD for its initial capital contribution were to be paid in five annual installments of $70 million each. Except for FY1991, appropriations fell short of the $70 million, leaving U.S. with arrears of more than $80 million after 5 year period. These arrears were fully cleared in 1998.
IBRD Intl Bank for Reconstruction & Development, IDA Intl Development Association
2 largest parts of World Bank Group, provide project and adjustment lending (balance-of-payments support based on policy reform) to developing countries. Poverty reduction & sustainable development are the central objectives of the World Bank's activities. The IBRD lends at near-commercial rates, while IDA provides credits to the poorest countries at highly concessional rates. Turkmenistan eligible only for IBRD terms. U.S. is largest contributor to IDA nearly 15%; U.S. covered 96% of its commitment due in first 2 years of replenishment, but is $62 million in arrears.

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