Introduction
1. By its resolution 1332 (2000) of 14 December 2000, the Security Council decided to
extend the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC) until 15 June 2001, and endorsed the Secretary-
General's proposal to deploy additional United Nations military observers to monitor and
verify the implementation of the ceasefire and disengagement plans adopted by the
parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815, annex).
2. In the same resolution, the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to consult
with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the parties concerned on the possibility
of organizing in February 2001 a follow-up meeting between the signatories of the
Lusaka Agreement and members of the Council. In addition, the Council requested the
Secretary-General to:
(a) Present a review of the implementation of the current mandate of MONUC, including
elements for an updated concept of operations;
(b) Submit proposals on ways to address the situation in the eastern provinces of the
DRCongo;
(c) Submit proposals for a mechanism to follow up on the withdrawal of foreign forces,
the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups, the security of the borders of the
DRCongo with Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, and
related issues.
3. The present report is submitted in accordance with these requests and reflects
developments since the Secretary-General's fifth report on MONUC of 6 December 2000
(S/2000/1156).
II. Political developments
4. President Laurent-Désiré Kabila was shot and fatally injured by a member of the
presidential bodyguard in Kinshasa on 16 January. I condemn assassination and the use
of force as a means of settling political differences. It is gratifying that the other parties
concerned have refrained from taking advantage of the situation.
5. On 17 January, Major General Joseph Kabila was entrusted with the powers and
responsibilities of Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Forces armées
congolaises (FAC) by a joint meeting of ministers and senior military officers. After the
State funeral of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila, members of the Congolese transitional
parliament approved unanimously the Government's nomination of Major General
Joseph Kabila as President of the DRCongo. However, both the
rebel groups and some elements of the Congolese political class have rejected the
emergence of Major General Kabila as Head of State.
6. On 21 January, the Heads of State of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe issued a
communiqué in which they undertook to maintain their respective military forces in the
DRCongo and reinforce the security of the population, the
Government and foreign citizens, including personnel of the United Nations and NGOs.
The leaders appealed to all parties to the Lusaka Agreement to refrain from any
offensive military movement; encouraged all parties to search for a political solution to
the conflict, expressing their conviction that dialogue and consultation were the
paths to follow; and called upon the United Nations to deploy additional military
observers to the DRCongo.
7. President Joseph Kabila made positive overtures to the international community by
receiving, prior to his inauguration on 26 January, members of the diplomatic corps in
Kinshasa, including the ambassadors of Belgium, and the 25 African countries and the
permanent members of the Security Council. In two meetings with my Special
epresentative, Mr. Kamel Morjane, the new President stated that the Government of the
DRCongo wished to extend its cooperation to the United
Nations and counted upon MONUC to continue fulfilling its mandate. The President also
attached great importance to the implementation of Council resolutions, particularly
those relating to the process of disengagement, the withdrawal of foreign forces and
the inter-Congolese dialogue. Mr. Morjane reiterated on my behalf to the President the
full commitment of the United Nations to assisting the DRCongo
in restoring peace and sought his support in creating the conditions necessary for the
deployment of additional United Nations military observers in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo.
8. On 26 January, in his first address to the Congolese people, President Joseph Kabila
outlined his vision for achieving peace in his country and the region. Calling for the
immediate withdrawal of the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi from Congolese
territory, the President advocated a policy of dialogue and reconciliation with
neighbouring States. The President committed himself to working, in conjunction with his
country's allies, to relaunch the Lusaka Agreement and indicated that he would seek
national reconciliation by means of political dialogue. In this regard, he expressed
gratitude to OAU for its involvement in the search for peace in his country, and
called for its further engagement in the process of co-facilitation of the inter-Congolese
dialogue. The President envisaged that once peace was consolidated in the country,
free and transparent elections would be held.
9. On 31 January, President Kabila visited Paris, where he met with President Chirac.
After attending an event organized by the Congress of the United States of America on 1
February, President Kabila then visited me in New York. I took the opportunity to extend
to him my condolences on his loss and to discuss the action to be taken to advance the
peace process. President Kabila also met with the Security Council. The record of that
meeting appears in document S/PV.4271.
10. On 7 February, President Kagame, who had also attended the Congressional event
in Washington, D.C., met with me at United Nations Headquarters. He then met with the
Security Council (see S/PV.4273).
11. Following discussions among regional leaders, the Joint Military Commission (JMC)
is expected to meet on 10 and 11 February in Lusaka, followed by a meeting of the
Political Committee on 11 and 12 February. A summit meeting is scheduled to take
place in Lusaka on 13 February. Preparations are also going forward for the meeting of
the Security Council with the Political Committee in New York on 21 and 22 February.
Congolese rebel movements
12. Following news of the assassination of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the rebel
movements denied any involvement in the act. They also condemned the use of
violence and reaffirmed their commitment to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. All rebel
leaders called for immediate progress in convening the inter-Congolese dialogue
stipulated in the Lusaka Agreement and denounced the installation of Major
General Joseph Kabila as President. Rebel leaders were unanimous in demanding the
establishment of a transitional government. In response to President Joseph Kabila's
national address on 26 January, rebel leaders reiterated their call for the inter-Congolese
dialogue to be convened without delay or conditionality.
13. On 17 January, three rebel movements merged to form the Front de libération du
Congo (FLC). The new movement comprises the Mouvement pour la liberation du
Congo (MLC), the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Mouvement de
libération (RCD-ML) and RCD-National (RCD-N). The merger envisages a single military
force and strategy vis-à-vis the government side. The current president of FLC is Mr.
Jean-Pierre Bemba, the former leader of MLC. Although Mr. Wamba dia Wamba was
said to have been appointed as vice-president, reports suggest that he has been
excluded from the FLC leadership following his denouncement of the merger as an
agreement of military convenience.
14. Further consolidation on the rebel side has been indicated by a senior member of
RCD, Mr. Bizima Karaha, who has announced that RCD and FLC share a common
vision on political issues which may lead to the formation of a common front under the
same political and military leadership. He predicted that unification would take place
within the near future. These developments represent the latest of many efforts on the
part of the rebel groups to achieve unification. Inter-Congolese dialogue
15. During the reporting period, Sir Ketumile Masire has remained committed to fulfilling
his responsibilities as neutral facilitator of the inter-Congolese dialogue. He has
continued to enjoy the explicit support of the Congolese rebel movements and
main political parties and civil society.
16. On 16 December, at the request of the Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, President Bongo sponsored a meeting between President Laurent-Désiré
Kabila and Congolese opposition groups. Although President Kabila traveled to
Libreville, the meeting did not take place owing to the non-attendance of the opposition
invitees.
17. While the Government of the DRCongo has not formally
withdrawn its rejection of Sir Ketumile Masire as the neutral facilitator, there have been
increasing indications that it is prepared to accept the appointment of a francophone
co-facilitator to work with Sir Ketumile. President Joseph Kabila appeared to endorse the
arrangement and, in his inaugural speech, requested OAU to help revive the peace
process, particularly with regard to the designation of a co-facilitator. However, the
leader of RCD later described the President's reference to co-facilitation
as a violation of the Lusaka Agreement, which does not provide for such a function.
18. Political parties in the DRCongo, which have hitherto been
silent owing to the continuing ban on their activities, are becoming vocal in calling for
implementation of the Lusaka Agreement, and specifically for the convening of the
inter-Congolese dialogue. They generally support the appointment of a francophone co-
facilitator. On 29 January, President Joseph Kabila met with representatives of four
principal political parties in Kinshasa.
III. Military developments
19. Though much of the country has remained quiet during the reporting period,
particularly over the past three weeks, military action was observed in both Equateur
province and Katanga in December and early January 2001. Scattered fighting, often
involving armed groups, has been reported from the Kivus.
Situation in Katanga
20. In late November, following attacks by government forces (FAC) in Katanga, RCD
and the Rwandan People's Army (RPA) launched a counter-attack which culminated in
their capture of Pweto on 6 December. Thousands of combatants and refugees fled into
Zambia to escape the fighting. Figures from the Zambian authorities indicate that over
5,000 combatants crossed the border. Subsequently, some 3,000 FAC and 200
Zimbabwean soldiers were disarmed and escorted back into the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Approximately 1,925 combatants, belonging to the Burundian
Front pour la Défence de la Démocratie (FDD), evaded disarmament by using barges to
cross Lake Mweru and enter the DRCongo. At present, some
144 disarmed soldiers remain in northern Zambia; 115 are seeking refugee status; and
29 are under investigation for membership of the former Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-
FAR), Interahamwe or FDD.
21. Following a meeting in Kinshasa on 22 December between President Laurent-Désiré
Kabila, President Mugabe and President Nujoma, President Mugabe warned that the
rebels would be forced out of Pweto if they did not leave voluntarily. Subsequently, there
was a build-up of Government and allied forces with reports of over 2,000 Angolan, 600
Zimbabwean and 3,000 FAC troops deployed between Kasenga and Pweto. On the
rebel side, six RCD battalions are said to be holding Pweto with two RPA brigades in
support.
22. During December and early January, there were numerous claims of ceasefire
violations and allegations from both sides that the other was preparing for an offensive.
On 28 December, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations,
claiming his country had acted in self-defence, wrote to the President of the Security
Council to complain of an ongoing campaign of misinformation directed against
his country (S/2000/1244). The Permanent Representative reiterated his Government's
offer of a 200-kilometre disengagement and its preparedness to withdraw from Pweto if
MONUC deployed there. On the same day, the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent
Mission of the DRCongo to the United Nations wrote to the
President of the Council to inform him that a brigade of RPA, supported by members of
the Uni n o Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), had launched
attacks on Katanga from Zambian territory (S/2000/1245).
23. Since early January, the MONUC Force Commander, General Mountaga Diallo, has
been discussing with the Governments and military authorities of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, and with RCD, the Rwandan offer to withdraw from
Pweto if MONUC deployed a military observer team to the town. MONUC has in fact
prepared a team to be deployed to Pweto. However, despite encouraging signals from
the Governments of both the DRCongo and Rwanda,
discussions on the specific modalities of the agreement are still continuing with the
military authorities of both sides. RCD has insisted that its concerns should be
addressed separately from those of Rwanda.
Fighting in Equateur province
24. In mid-December, MLC began a military offensive across a broad front in northern
Equateur, capturing Imese and Befale. Government and allied forces reinforced their
positions around Mbandaka. In mid-January, MLC forces attacking Bolomba were
repulsed after heavy fighting. Since 18 January, the military situation has become static,
with no reports of significant fighting.
Eastern provinces
25. The security situation in parts of the eastern DRCongo
remains highly volatile. RCD has complained that armed groups continue to launch
numerous attacks in the Kivus. Although the armed groups responsible for these attacks
are not signatories to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, there are persistent reports of
their receiving arms and training from FAC. (The situation in the eastern provinces is
explored in more detail in paras. 85-88 below.)
26. In the Ituri area, ethnic tension between the Lendu and Hema communities
increased dramatically on 19 January when Lendu tribesmen attacked a Ugandan
People's Defence Force (UPDF) and an RCD-ML position at Bunia airfield. The fighting
resulted in serious casualties and was followed by attacks mounted by the Hema
population on Lendu civilians (see paras. 56-57 below).
27. MONUC dispatched a military and humanitarian team to Kampala and Bunia on 24
January. In Kampala, the Ugandan Army Commander accepted that UPDF was
responsible for the security of the civilian population in the Bunia area and undertook to
make every effort to contain the violence. Since 22 January, MONUC military observers
in Bunia have reported the situation in the town to be tense but with UPDF in effective
control. MONUC is discussing with the humanitarian agencies follow-up action aimed at
improving relations between the two communities.
28. Concern has also been expressed over repeated attacks on the Banyamulenge
population in South Kivu. This matter is dealt with in more detail in paragraph 59 below.
Kisangani
29. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), Rwanda and Uganda have
continued to keep their forces at a distance of some 100 kilometres from Kisangani.
However, RCD military elements have remained in the city, with its leaders maintaining
that security concerns do not allow them to withdraw their forces before the arrival of
United Nations troops. The area around Kisangani has been de facto divided into
quadrants: RCD occupies the south and west; MLC and UPDF the north-west and the
north; and UPDF solely the east. This dispersal is generally respected, except
for isolated skirmishes usually between RCD and MLC/RCD-N in the diamond mining
area to the north of the city.
Implementation of disengagement plans
30. The military chiefs of staff of the parties, with the exception of MLC, ratified the
detailed sub-plans for disengagement and redeployment in Harare on 6 December. The
MLC delegate had received instructions not to sign the document, as it did not contain a
reference to the inter-Congolese dialogue. Subsequently, a spokesman for RCD
indicated that its forces, too, would not comply with the disengagement plans unless
President Laurent-Désiré Kabila opened talks on the formation of a transitional
government and disarmed pro-government militias in the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo.
31. Pursuant to the Harare disengagement plan, MONUC received notification from
Angola, the DRCongo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and
Zimbabwe that executive orders had been issued to their military forces to begin the
disengagement process. No notification has yet been received from the rebel
movements.
32. The Harare disengagement plan stipulated that the military forces of the parties
would undertake a 15-kilometre disengagement over a two-week period starting 21
January. None of the parties has yet complied. There are indications that the
implementation of the disengagement plans has become dependent on progress in
convening the inter-Congolese dialogue envisaged by the Lusaka Agreement, as the
Congolese rebel movements insist that the two processes - military and political - are
inextricably linked. Nonetheless, MONUC is proceeding on the assumption that the
parties will indeed carry out their disengagement plan.
Withdrawal of foreign forces
33. On 9 January, President Laurent-Désiré Kabila brokered talks in Libreville between
President Buyoya and Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, the leader of FDD, the main
Burundian rebel group. Subsequently, Leonard She Okintundu, Foreign Minister of the
DRCongo, informed the Kinshasa diplomatic corps that both
parties had agreed to withdraw their forces from the DRCongo.
On 23 January, FDD made it known that the death of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila
had not affected its willingness to continue talks with the Burundian Government. In a
statement, the Burundian Government confirmed that its meetings with FDD had
been successful and would be pursued.
34. Resolutions 1304 (2000) and 1332 (2000), in which the Security Council demanded
the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces from the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo without further delay, in conformity with the timetable of the
Lusaka Agreement and the Kampala disengagement plan, have yet to be implemented
in full. Reports indicate the presence of approximately 20,000 RPA and 10,000
UPDF troops in the DRCongo and there has been no clear
indication of any significant reduction in force levels. Senior Rwandan officials have
continued to emphasize their country's security concerns, and to demand that measures
be taken to disarm and demobilize the armed groups in the eastern provinces of the
DRCongo before the withdrawal of RPA proceeds.
Ugandan officials, including President Museveni, have recently indicated that, following
the defeat of Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels, the underlying objective of their
intervention has been achieved.
35. On the government side, it is estimated that there are approximately 12,000
Zimbabwean, 7,000 Angolan and 2,000 Namibian troops deployed in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Since my last report, the force levels of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) allies have increased in response to the military
reversals in Katanga and the security concerns in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi following
the assassination of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila. There are persistent allegations
from Rwanda that FAC contains large numbers of ex-FAR and Interahamwe fighters.
IV. Cooperation with the Joint Military Commission (JMC)
36. The operations of JMC have continued to be hindered by a lack of resources. OAU
has advised JMC that it is unlikely that there will be sufficient funds to cover envisaged
requirements this year.
37. On 26 January, the OAU secretariat announced that Brigadier Njuki Mwaniki of
Kenya had been appointed as the new Chairman of JMC. Brigadier Mwaniki assumed
his duties in Lusaka at the end of January and has undertaken a briefing mission to
Kinshasa and other locations.
V. Status of MONUC deployment
Current deployment
38. As of 8 February, MONUC had a total of 200 military personnel. Within the
DRCongo, in addition to Kinshasa, military liaison officers are
deployed to the headquarters of the rebel movements (Bunia, Gbadolite and Goma) and
the four regional joint military commissions (Boende, Kabalo, Kabinda and Lisala).
Military observer teams are also stationed in six other locations (Gemena, Isiro,
Kananga, Kindu, Kisangani and Mbandaka). In addition, a team has been deployed at
Nchelenge in northern Zambia. Twenty-three liaison officers are stationed in the capitals
of surrounding countries, including 14 officers who provide planning support to JMC in
Lusaka. Finally, MONUC maintains one military liaison officer with OAU in Addis Ababa
(see map and annex).
39. MONUC has established three sector headquarters for the implementation of the
Kampala/Harare disengagement plans. The first, with a small staff of military and civilian
officers, was opened in Kisangani in June. Since my last report, sector headquarters
have been opened in Mbandaka and Kananga. MONUC logistic bases necessary to
support the deployment of observers and troops are operational in Kinshasa, Goma and
Bangui in the Central African Republic.
Security of MONUC personnel
40. The parties have continued to provide generally satisfactory security for MONUC
military and civilian personnel. In Bunia, UPDF are responsible for protecting MONUC
premises. In Kinshasa, the Government has, since 15 December, assigned 35 civilian
policemen for the protection of the premises and assets of MONUC at its headquarters,
logistic base and Kinshasa airport. Despite the uncertainty created by the assassination
of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the capital has remained calm.
41. In South Kivu, the frequency of attacks by armed groups has forced international
agencies and non-governmental organizations to suspend many of their operations. The
threat posed by the armed groups precludes the deployment of MONUC military
observers in the eastern provinces at this time.
Cooperation of the parties
42. Since 30 September, weekly meetings between MONUC and the Commissariat
général chargé des affaires de la MONUC have been held to assess the compliance by
the Government of the DRCongo with the Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) provisions. This improved liaison has continued to yield positive
results; and past difficulties over customs clearances, exemption of direct and indirect
taxes, fuel surcharges, authorization for a frequency and telecommunications network
and facilities at Kinshasa airport have been resolved harmoniously. Joint
MONUC/Government reconnaissance missions to Mbandaka and Kananga
have also been completed.
43. The Government of the DRCongo has yet to replace the
system of flight notification on a case-by-case basis with a system for advance
notification en bloc, an arrangement that is essential for the management of the large
fleet of aircraft required for MONUC phase II deployment. The Commissariat has
assured MONUC that such a system will be introduced once phase II deployment
commences. Nevertheless, there has been a more positive attitude and lifting of
restrictions, in particular the obligation to land at a neutral airport during a return trip from
rebel-controlled areas and the requirement to route all MONUC flights through
Kinshasa.
44. In field locations, MONUC military observers have encountered occasional
limitations on their freedom of movement imposed by local commanders. However, the
greatest impediment to the movement of military observers is the nature of the terrain,
since most routes become impassable more than 25 kilometres from any MONUC base.
VI. Humanitarian aspects
45. Owing to the continuing fighting in the Equateur region, North and South Kivu,
Katanga and Province Orientale, the latest estimate concerning the number of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the DRCongo is 2 million,
and this figure is expected to rise further. Added to the refugee population, the total
affected population in the DRCongo is over 2,335,000.
Fewer than half of these displaced individuals receive humanitarian assistance. There
are thought to be some 640,000 IDPs in North Kivu, over 350,000 in South Kivu,
305,000 in Katanga and 300,000 in Equateur. In the Kivus alone, this number has
increased more than fourfold over the last 12 months. As a result of violent
confrontations between Lema and Hendu tribes in the Ituri district in Province Orientale,
some 12,500 people are said to have fled Bunia for the outlying countryside
and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
assesses that another 6,000-9,000 have sought refuge in Uganda over the past few
weeks. The refugee population in the DRCongo is estimated at
332,000. Non-assisted Angolan and Rwandan refugees number 67,000 and 48,000,
respectively. The assisted refugees include people from the Sudan, Uganda and
Burundi.
46. Following fighting during the year 2000, Congolese refugees have arrived in the
Betou, Impfondo and Loukolela areas in the Congo. It is estimated that 100,000
refugees from the DRCongo are now in the Congo, of which
12 per cent are considered vulnerable. UNHCR plans to provide emergency assistance
to these refugees to facilitate their integration into their new communities. The World
Food Programme (WFP) is expected to provide essential needs (rice, beans, salt) for a
period of six months. Though the security situation has been relatively calm, any
deterioration could hamper aid efforts.
47. As a result of recent fighting in the Pweto region (Katanga), a considerable number
of people have sought refuge in neighbouring Zambia; about 9,000 of them are hosted in
a refugee camp near Kala in Zambia's northern province, and a further 15,000 have
settled in villages in the same area.
48. It is estimated that there are some 16 million people with critical food needs
throughout the DRCongo. The main reasons behind the food
security crisis include prolonged displacement, the intensification of the war resulting in
the rupturing of traditional sources of supply, and a staggering increase in prices coupled
with a decline in purchasing power. As previously reported, the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that 70 per cent of the 6 million-7
million people living in the capital city cannot afford $1 a day for food. In addition,
children are hardest hit by chronic malnutrition, especially in the major urban
centres of Kinshasa, Kabinda, Kananga, Mbuji-Mayi, Mbandaka and Kisangani.
49. The health situation in the DRCongo has continued to
deteriorate with the continuing neglect of health facilities, the lack of essential
medication, and the difficulty of dispatching medical supplies to the regions of the
DRCongo. The health system is also seriously afflicted by the
lack of equipment, insufficient training of medical personnel, and a significant lack of
funding. In addition, it is estimated that only 37 per cent of the population has access to
essential medicine and 47 per cent to potable water. Mother and child mortality rates
remain very high, and overall vaccination coverage is low (tuberculosis: 30
per cent; polio: 22 per cent; measles: 24 per cent). Inadequate sanitary and hygiene
conditions, as well as malnutrition, have created a fertile environment for the
spread of diseases. In Pweto, some 4,700 cases of cholera with 360 deaths were
recorded during the year 2000. New diseases are also emerging, among which
haemorrhagic fever and monkey pox pose the greatest threat. Finally, human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) prevalence among the population aged 15-49 years is
of the order of 5 per cent, and a total of 1.1 million people are infected. Generally
speaking, standard health indicators today have not improved since the
survey carried out by the Health Ministry and the World Health Organization (WHO) in
1998.
50. Last November, a consolidated appeal was launched for a total of $37 million. To
date, only 30.5 per cent of the amount has been received.
51. After the United Nations Inter-agency Mission that came to the Democratic Republic
of the Congo in November 2000 submitted its report in New York and following further
discussions in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), it was decided that the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Resident Representative/Resident
Coordinator in the DRCongo would also be the Humanitarian
Coordinator for the country in order to ensure the most effective response to the
situation. At the subnational level, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
of the United Nations Secretariat (OCHA) will continue to maintain a Coordinator for the
eastern DRCongo based in Goma. In a related development,
the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat
will be opening an office in Lubumbashi.
52. In South Kivu, the National Immunization Days 2001 are being prepared, following
the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)/WHO workshop on national planning
which was held in Goma in mid-December. The workshop planned by the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat to take place in
Kisangani from 9 to 12 December was postponed owing to lack of governmental
participation.
53. The Governments of the Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic have
continued to express concern that the fighting in Equateur, especially in the immediate
border areas, is affecting their stability. In particular, refugees continue to enter both
countries and maritime traffic on the Ubangui River has been interrupted causing heavy
economic losses. There have also been persistent rumours of MLC elements
infiltrating down the Ubangui on the west bank towards the confluence of the Congo and
Ubangui rivers.
VII. Human rights
54. The human rights situation in the DRCongo remains a
cause of serious concern. Numerous human rights violations have been continuing with
impunity, compounded by renewed outbreaks of political and ethnic tensions. Some of
these take the form of clashes between various armed groups and ethnic groups,
including the Hema and Lendu in the Ituri district, and the Banyamulenge in South Kivu.
The creation by the Government of armed self-defence groups (Forces d'Auto-défense
Populaire (FAP)) has also caused unease.
55. Widespread killings and the destruction of property, extrajudiciary executions and
forced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and illegal detention of local staff members of
international organizations, civil society, business leaders and foreigners living in
the DRCongo, as well as serious restrictions on the freedom of
the press and of movement, have characterized the situation recently.
56. From 29 to 31 January, a delegation of the Field Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights undertook a mission to Bunia. The delegation was able
to collect first-hand information and interview eyewitnesses. On the basis of these
preliminary findings, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights team confirmed that a massacre of ethnic Lendu had been carried out
by ethnic Hema militias in Bunia on 19 January. At least 200 people were killed and
some 40 wounded. The majority of the victims were civilians, including women and
children. Some of them were killed with machetes and some decapitated. Some of the
bodies were thrown into open latrines. UPDF troops stood by during the killings and
failed to protect the civilians.
57. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Mr. Roberto Garretón, issued on 26 January a press release condemning
the massacre in Bunia. He called on the Government of Uganda and FLC to order their
troops immediately to protect non-combatants and civilians and to launch investigations
of the above-mentioned incident with a view to identifying those responsible and bringing
them to justice.
58. In addition, serious human rights violations were also reported in the Kivus following
the repeated attacks and retaliation by various armed groups. In Bukavu, the local
authorities have arrested representatives of civil society and other civilians. Reports
have been received that some of the arrested persons have been tortured.
59. Serious inter-ethnic tensions have also been reported in South Kivu Province.
According to some reports, massacres of the Banyamulenge population have taken
place. Human rights staff from MONUC intend to visit the area to evaluate the situation
on the ground, sensitize the local authorities on the alarming reports received and
propose further action to be taken to resolve the crisis.
60. In the Government-controlled areas, the representatives of civil society are also
subjected to harassment, arbitrary arrest and illegal detention. Recently in Kinshasa,
four leaders of the civil society, and members of a political party and of business were
arrested and detained without cause. Journalists working for private media can no longer
carry out their functions freely. A recent decision of the Minister of Communications has
prohibited the publication of more than 100 local newspapers for non-compliance with
government legislation.
61. Cases of arbitrary arrests, summary and extrajudiciary executions are still frequently
reported. A recent example is the case of Commander Masasu, a senior army officer
arrested for allegedly planning a coup against the late President. The Government has
continued to deny reports that Commander Masasu was executed in December. Several
other military personnel and civilians from the Kivus and others close to Masasu have
also been arrested and detained. These included a local staff member of the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in the Congo who was
arrested in Kinshasa on 3 January and held by DEMIAP (Détection militaire des
activités anti-patrie) until his release on 10 January, with serious restrictions on his
freedom of movement.
62. The Military Court continues to apply the death penalty. Many defendants are being
arbitrarily condemned to death. Recently, on 11 December, the bodyguard of the Chief
of Staff of the Police, was condemned to death by this special court. He was accused of
having broken into the residence of the Governor of the Central Bank of the Congo even
though he insisted that he was innocent. He was executed the following day with seven
others from the Central Prison of Kinshasa without having been given a chance to
appeal according to conventional international human rights norms. However, in January
another suspect was arrested for the same offence.
63. Continuing human rights violations, coupled with the absence of democratic reforms,
have brought the country to a political standstill. Even as many members of the
opposition are being freed from detention centres, many leaders of the political parties
live abroad to avoid harassment and restrictions.
64. Against this background, there have been two positive developments since the visit
in October 2000 of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mrs.
Robinson, and the commitment made then by the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo to improving the human rights situation. Firstly, the Government
released 900 detainees, including over 200 political prisoners and journalists. Secondly,
the new President has announced that respect for human rights, the security of the
individual and of property, the reform of military justice and the constitutionality
of governmental action will be the priorities of his Administration. Effective immediately,
the jurisdiction of the military courts will be restricted to matters falling under the code of
military justice.
VIII. Child protection
65. The situation relating to the recruitment of children into armed forces and various
warring groups has not improved significantly during the reporting period. Owing to the
growing protest of non-governmental organizations, UNICEF and MONUC, RCD has
halted its military recruitment campaign in urban areas. However, RCD has contested
the allegation that it was recruiting child soldiers and indicated that the young people had
joined the movement of their own accord. They were not deployed to the front lines.
However, information received from other sources indicates that recruitment is
continuing in rural areas of Kivu, including Kahele, Idjwi Island, Musongati and Rugano.
It has also been reported that all newly recruited children are transported to camps in
Masisi for military training. The Mushaki camp is believed to have received over
3,000 newly recruited young soldiers, more than 60 per cent of whom are under age 18.
MONUC has sought and received from RCD permission to visit the camps. It is hoped
that better RCD cooperation with MONUC and UNICEF can lead to the implementation
of RCD's 15 May decision to start demobilizing child soldiers.
66. As indicated in my 6 December 2000 report, a considerable number of Congolese
children were taken from the Bunia, Beni and Butembo region, apparently for military
training in Uganda (para. 75). Concern has been expressed at the possibility that these
children will be deployed back to the DRCongo as soldiers. As
the present report was being finalized, information was received that 600 children would
be transferred to the custody of humanitarian organizations next week.
67. The late President Kabila had granted access to the military camps for the initiation
of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. This is a first step towards
the implementation of the 9 June decree on demobilization. UNICEF has established a
working agreement with the local branch of an international NGO, the Bureau
International Catholique de l'Enfance (BICE), as the major partner for the process, which
will be undertaken in collaboration with the Government.
IX. Financial aspects
68. The General Assembly, by its resolution 54/260 A of 7 April 2000, granted me
commitment authority, with assessment, in the amount of $200 million to cover the
Mission's immediate requirements and to enable it to initiate logistic preparations for the
phased deployment of the formed military personnel. By its subsequent resolution
54/260 B of 15 June 2000, the Assembly, taking into account the amount of $58.7
million committed for MONUC during the period ending 30 June 2000, authorized me to
use during the period beginning 1 July 2000 the amount of $141.3 million representing
the balance of the commitment authority provided for MONUC in its resolution
54/260 A.
69. Should the Security Council adopt the draft revised concept of operations for
MONUC contained in paragraphs 71 to 84 below, the related immediate costs will be
met from within resources already approved by the General Assembly for the current
financial period. With regard to the financial period 2001-2002 beginning on 1 July 2001,
I shall seek the necessary resources for MONUC from the Assembly during its resumed
fifty-fifth session.
70. As at 31 January 2001, unpaid assessed contributions to the MONUC special
account amounted to $79.7 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all
peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $2,652.4 million.
X. Next steps
Updated concept of operations
71. On the basis of the experience gained since September 1999, when MONUC was
first deployed to the DRCongo, the Secretariat has developed a
revised draft concept of operations for a deployment of military personnel to monitor and
verify actions taken by the parties in compliance with the disengagement and
redeployment plan they signed at Harare on 6 December. The updated draft concept
was elaborated during a visit of Department of Peacekeeping Operations planners to
MONUC between 8 and 19 January.
72. Given the fragile ceasefire, the size of the country and the difficulties of access and
mobility beyond major towns, the concept of operations is based upon a gradual build-up
of capability that encourages the parties to cease hostilities, positions MONUC to
respond in a timely and effective manner once the parties begin the disengagement and
redeployment process, and minimizes risks to United Nations personnel.
73. Simultaneously, the measures proposed to be taken by MONUC can set in place the
conditions for subsequent expansion of the mission for possible later tasks in the eastern
provinces.
74. The revised concept of operations has four phases. During the preparatory phase,
which is now under way, MONUC will make maximum use of its existing resources to
build on its presence in the DRCongo by deploying further
military observer teams and redeploying others to establish sector headquarters at
Kisangani, Mbandaka, Kananga and Kalemie.
75. These sector headquarters are an integral part of the command, control and
communications infrastructure that will enable MONUC to coordinate the additional
military observer teams required for verification and monitoring of the disengagement
and redeployment. The four regional joint military commissions (currently located at
Lisala, Boende, Kabinda and Kabalo) will be relocated with the MONUC sector
headquarters to facilitate the close liaison, coordination and confidence-building required
to effect the verification and monitoring process. The regional joint military commissions
have requested that MONUC provide them with limited logistic support to enable them to
fulfil their functions.
76. The draft concept proposed in the present report envisages the deployment of up to
550 military observers. It will also be necessary to deploy up to 1,900 armed personnel
to guard equipment, facilities and supplies located at the sector headquarters and
support bases. Two riverine units totalling some 400 troops are also envisaged, as well
as the necessary rotary and fixed-wing air assets. At least initially, all deployment and
sustainment are expected to take place through air transportation. The use of
specialized support services, whether provided by military units or through commercial
contracts, is also envisaged. The total military personnel required will therefore amount
to approximately 3,000 officers and other ranks.
77. It is important to stress that the function of the 1,900 armed personnel will be
exclusively to guard United Nations facilities, equipment and supplies against tampering
or pilfering. They will not be able to extract other United Nations personnel at risk, or
accompany humanitarian convoys, nor will they be able to extend protection to the local
population. United Nations personnel will be withdrawn from any situation where undue
risk appears to be developing. The guard units may be able to assist in any such
evacuation.
78. The Harare disengagement plan allows two weeks for the completion of the
verification phase, which begins once the parties have disengaged and moved to
designated intermediate and new defensive positions. Thereafter MONUC is to conduct
verification and monitoring of the process sequentially across the four areas identified
within the plan, in blocks of 14 days, for which an additional 32 four-person military
observer teams will be required. These teams will initially be based at the sector
headquarter sites. They will also be deployed to conduct verification of the
redeployment, predominantly by air, employing a mix of rotary and fixed-wing aircraft.
79. The military observer teams currently deployed at the 13 team sites within the
DRCongo contribute significantly to stability in their
immediate vicinity and will remain in place to continue their liaison and reporting
functions. Where access permits, they will also conduct verification and
monitoring tasks.
80. Significant resources will be required to support completion of the verification phase
and enable MONUC to maintain effective monitoring thereafter. Appropriate medical
facilities, air assets (including full air operations and ground support), communications,
general support services and administrative staff will be deployed to each of the sector
headquarters.
81. In order to maximize the confidence-building aspects of the MONUC military
deployment, it would also be my intention to deploy civilian staff, including political,
human rights, humanitarian, public information and child protection officers, to the sector
headquarters as the operation proceeded. These civilian officers would need to be
provided with appropriate support and equipment, including vehicles and
communications facilities.
82. Once the initial redeployment verification is complete, MONUC will continue to
monitor the 27 new defensive positions to be occupied by the FAC/SADC allies and
MLC/UPDF and the 15 intermediate positions of RCD/RPA. A second redeployment of
RCD/RPA will follow, under MONUC verification, resulting in the consolidation of these
forces at 12 new defensive positions.
83. Upon completion of the disengagement and redeployment operation, MONUC will be
positioned and capable of monitoring continuously the parties' forces occupying a total of
39 new defensive positions.In addition, MONUC will need the capability to deploy
military observers to investigate specific incidents, report on alleged violations and
monitor the activities of any sizeable forces not declared as part of the disengagement
plan but within 50 kilometres of the disengagement zone. It is anticipated that a further
38 military observer teams will be required to sustain this prolonged monitoring phase. In
the event that RPA withdraws some of its units to any of its 11 designated new defensive
positions, further observer teams may be required to provide constant monitoring of up
to 53 separate positions. If required, four small coordination centres, subordinated to the
four sector headquarters, will be established to ease control of the increased
military observer activity.
84. It is intended to deploy river boat units, probably at Kinshasa and Mbandaka, to build
confidence by showing a United Nations presence, enhancing the flexibility of MONUC
re-supply activities and assisting with the movement of military observers where access
is otherwise restricted. An additional benefit could be the stimulation of trade along the
river. MONUC also intends to put in place a public information capability that will enable
it to explain and clarify MONUC's intentions and activities and to respond in a more
timely and effective manner to statements by the parties.
Deployment of infantry units
85. In paragraph 8 of its resolution 1332 (2000), the Security Council expressed its
readiness to support the Secretary-General, as soon as he considered that conditions
allowed it, in the deployment of infantry units in support of the military observers in
Kisangani and Mbandaka in due course and, subject to the proposals submitted by him
under paragraph 7 of that resolution, to other areas he might deem necessary, including
possibly to Goma or Bukavu.
86. MONUC will continue to assess the conditions for infantry deployment in the
DRCongo, within the context of paragraphs 7 and 8 of Security
Council resolution 1332 (2000). The situation in this regard is expected to become
clearer following the successful completion of the present disengagement and
redeployment plan, and a separate report will be submitted at that time.
Situation in eastern provinces and border areas
87. The situation in the eastern DRCongo, in particular the
Kivus, remains volatile. The present conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and its predecessor in 1996, began in the Kivus. The territories are now home to
the RCD rebels, RPA troops and several militia groups. They are highly militarized zones
and have been the site of widespread suffering, humanitarian deprivation and human
rights violations. The economy and society of the Kivus have been devastated and long-
standing ethnic tensions have been inflamed by repeated heavy flows of refugees and
displaced persons.
88. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement acknowledged the concerns of Rwanda, Uganda
and Burundi over the presence of the armed groups which threaten the security of their
borders, and recognized that the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops would be
linked directly to progress made in the disarmament and demobilization of the militias.
The Agreement called for a mechanism for the disarming of militias and armed groups,
including the genocidal forces.
89. The issue was raised in the summit meeting convened by President Qaddafi in
November 2000 (see S/2000/1156, para. 14). Subsequently, following the Maputo
summit of 16 October, two meetings of Defence Ministers took place in Pretoria to
consider plans put forward by the DRCongo and Rwanda.
However, both plans merely assumed that a United Nations force on the borders of
Rwanda and Uganda would have the responsibility for disarmament of the armed
groups.
90. MONUC has assessed that a peacekeeping force on its own is unlikely to achieve
the desired result of restoring peace, security and stability to the Kivus. Additional efforts
are required to repair relations between ethnic groups in the Kivus, ensure respect for
human rights, address the humanitarian disaster engulfing the population, and resolve
land and citizenship issues.
Establishment of a permanent follow-up mechanism
91. In my last report, I detailed the intense diplomatic activity and personal initiatives of
Heads of State in the region and commended their dedication and perseverance in
efforts to put the peace process back on track. I observed, however, that broad
agreement on the key questions had so far not been achieved, and expressed the view
that the best way to achieve such agreement would be to build on the valuable
diplomatic initiatives taken and to provide a framework and a stimulus for their follow-up.
As noted in paragraph 2 above, the Security Council requested me to report
further on this matter.
92. My consideration of the need for the establishment of a mechanism to draw together
the various diplomatic initiatives and pursue workable arrangements came at a time
when little progress was being made in the peace process. While the underlying
problems at the heart of the conflict have not yet been resolved, the positive signals
given by the new President of the DRCongo regarding the
implementation of the Lusaka Agreement and his openness towards the international
community give reason to hope that the goodwill that he has demonstrated can be
translated into progress in convening the inter-Congolese dialogue, implementing
the Harare disengagement plan and addressing the complex issue of the armed groups.
In addition, an increased level of bilateral contacts have been taking place that could do
much to build confidence between the parties and lead to tangible results. The direct
talks between President Buyoya and the leader of FDD, and between President Kabila
and President Kagame in Washington, D.C., on 1 February, are an indication of a
more positive approach by the parties concerned and the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo in particular.
93. I believe that sufficient time should be allowed for the new positive spirit and
encouraging contacts to bear fruit. Accordingly, I believe it would be prudent to delay
submitting proposals for the establishment of a new mechanism within the peace
process and to keep the situation under review. I encourage the Heads of State in the
region to pursue their initiatives to reactivate the peace process.
Strengthening the MONUC human rights component
94. The main activities of MONUC's human rights component so far have been
monitoring and reporting government activities. With a view to expanding its activities,
MONUC, together with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, has been designing programmes aimed at building the capacity of the justice and
prison systems of the DRCongo, as well as technical assistance
to civil society. Once implemented, these would help the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo to meet its human rights obligations under the Constitution of the
DRCongo and the international human rights instruments it has
ratified.
95. Additional programmes include raising human rights awareness and stimulating
debate; the exercise of individual rights; strengthening civil society; and the integration of
human rights principles into the activities of the international community in the
DRCongo. MONUC also intends to deploy human rights officers
to the military sector headquarters identified in paragraph 74 above, as well as in
Bukavu, Kindu, Gbadolite, Kananga and Boende.
XI. Observations & recommendations
96. The tumultuous events in the DRCongo, tragic as they were,
have transformed the situation in a way that gives grounds for cautious hope. The
successive visits of President Joseph Kabila and President Kagame, first to Washington,
D.C., and then to United Nations Headquarters to meet with me and with the Security
Council, can be seen as marking the beginning of a new stage in the consideration by
the United Nations of the conflict in the DRCongo.
97. I am heartened by the calm that has descended on the confrontation lines that divide
the hostile forces in the DRCongo. Almost since it was signed,
in July and August 1999, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement has been subjected to
regular, and sometimes large-scale, violations by the parties that signed it. That fact that
no significant violations of the ceasefire have been reported since mid-January is in
itself a cause of satisfaction.
98. Equally hopeful are the signs, which await clarification, that the Government of the
DRCongo may be willing to accept the role of Sir Ketumile
Masire, the neutral facilitator appointed pursuant to the Lusaka Agreement to help
bring together all Congolese to discuss the governance of their country. When Sir
Ketumile can resume his essential functions in this regard, and whether he will
do so in collaboration with a co-facilitator, or some other form of high-level assistance,
are questions that remain to be resolved. I look forward to further developments in this
matter, and would be grateful for any advice and assistance that OAU may be able to
offer. The general liberalization of the political climate in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo would do much to set a positive tone for this wide-ranging dialogue.
99. Amid these grounds for cautious optimism, the United Nations should be ready to
advance, at least with small steps. The revised concept of operations, which I propose to
the Security Council in paragraphs 71 to 84 above, is designed to equip MONUC to
assist the parties in carrying out the disengagement of their forces along a confrontation
line that currently divides the DRCongo in half. A successful
disengagement, under the monitoring and verification of United Nations military
observers, would be an important advance towards the goals that have been endorsed
both by the Lusaka Agreement and by the Council. I refer to the early withdrawal of all
foreign forces from the territory of the DRCongo.
100. I therefore recommend to the Security Council the adoption of the draft concept I
have proposed, and call for the support of Council members and troop-contributing
countries as we take the steps necessary to carry it out. I also recommend that MONUC
be strengthened with the addition of the necessary additional civilian staff, including a
reinforced human rights component, as outlined above.
101. The commitment to peace that President Joseph Kabila has already demonstrated
is welcome for many reasons. Respect for the ceasefire could permit humanitarian
agencies to gain access to all populations in need. Greater progress could be achieved
in promoting human rights and the rights of children, including child soldiers, once the
fighting has stopped. It would also be possible to address outbreaks of communal
violence not directly related to the main conflict, such as those in Ituri and South Kivu.
102. I deplore the outbreaks of intercommunal violence in Bunia and in South Kivu. I call
on the local authorities in each case to find peaceful ways of resolving the issues, to
permit secure humanitarian access as soon as possible, and to refrain from taking
any action that might inflame those issues. I also call on them to cooperate with MONUC
human rights officers and the Special Rapporteur in any investigation that might be
launched into these outbreaks of violence.
103. The involvement of regional Heads of State in the search for solutions to the conflict
in the DRCongo has been a considerable asset to the
international community. I commend the initiatives launched by the Heads of State most
concerned aimed at building on agreements reached at Lusaka, Maputo and elsewhere.
I had the opportunity to discuss some of these initiatives at the Afrique-France
conference at Yaoundé in mid-January and at the Davos economic summit at the end of
that month.
104. Finally, I wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Kamel
Morjane, and to the MONUC Force Commander and to all the civilian and military
personnel of MONUC for their commitment, and encourage them to continue their efforts
as they prepare for the next stage of their activities in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
